Values Group Changes In The UK 1973 – 2020

Every few years the motivational values researchers CDSM Cultural Dynamics Strategy and Marketing run a national survey to take a snapshot of values groups in the UK, broken out as 12 Values Modes and three large ‘Maslow Groups’, Settlers, Prospectors and Pioneers.  (For explanation and links to the many papers/blogs using this system at this website see here).

Pat Dade at CDSM has just shared some 2020 results with me, which I’ve summarised in this post.  ‘Values’ in this sense are linked sets of attitudes and beliefs which are deeply and largely unconsciously held to be true – how the world really is.  We see the world through them and they play a big role in how we interpret information, developments, opportunities etc.   They tend to change slowly, and numerous researchers such as Ron Inglehart in the World Values Survey, have tracked them changing across generations.

The current UK survey – conducted in early May in the midst of the covid epidemic – shows the proportion of Pioneers (Inner Directeds) and Prospectors (Outer Directeds) have both slightly increased since 2016, while the proportion of Settlers (Security Driven) have slightly decreased (this is a zero sum game – everyone is in just one of these Maslow Groups or the smaller Values Modes within them).

This continues the long term trend of the society becoming more Pioneer-ish as a gradually increasing proportion of the population meet their needs for safety, security and identity (hence individuals moving from Settler to Prospector), and for esteem (hence moving from Prospector to Pioneer), seen since 1973.  I’ve plotted the percentage of each ‘MG’ here, taking 1973 as year 1.

Students of values will notice that unlike the 2005-2010 dip in the number of Prospectors and the rise in Settlers, which was associated with the recession, so far there has been no such effect in 2020 but it is early days.  That ‘glitch’ in the ‘values conveyor’ led to a shrinking in the number of Now People, the optimistic high energy Prospector ‘leaders’ and a ‘pile-up’ of Golden Dreamers (the entry mode Prospectors), and consequent increase in Settlers not transitioning to Prospector.  The Settler>Prospector transition appeared to have restarted in earnest by 2016 and is now continuing.  From a social point of view that is good news (net ‘improving’ conditions).

From a political point of view it places even more importance on not forgetting the needs, psychological as much as material, of the Settlers, as was explored in my earlier blogs on Brexit (in which Settlers were much more strongly pro-Brexit than Prospectors (split) and Pioneers (mainly against it except for some more libertarian types).   However in attending to these needs, UK politicians of parties trying to reach across values in a way that represents Britain as a whole, must recognise that the values centre-of-gravity in the UK lies more to the Pioneer end of the values spectrum than the Settler end, and that’s not just true amongst the young.

If ‘the prospects for success’ start to dim in the next months and years, the Prospectors, normally not very ‘political’, will start to kick up, and they are 39% of the population.  A battleground for Starmer and Johnson.    Starmer has to recover lost Prospector and Settler support but in terms of an energetic and forward-looking optimistic Britain, his most useful VM allies will be the Transcenders and Now People. An interesting problem.

If it turns out that Brexit does not deliver for Settlers and the Golden Dreamer Prospectors (the latter were split on it), things could get quite bitter and despondent.  Dominic Cummings and other Leave campaigners played the Settler values pitch very well but he may have fatally blotted his copy-book by ‘saying one thing and doing the opposite’ over lockdown.  Breaking the rules, especially when they themselves have dutifully upheld them, is not something Settlers will easily forgive – it’s not honourable.

Politics aside, these values proportions show, as mentioned in my previous blog on Covid and campaigns, that although we’ve all been prioritising safety and security in response to the epidemic threat (ie adopting some of the main priorities of Settlers), that does not change our underlying motivational values.  (And as a very domestic UK aside, ‘clapping for the NHS’ got cross-values participation, whereas the VE Day celebrations pitched in jingoistic terms by the Johnson government, were a much more Settler-Golden Dreamer affair).  Values powerfully influence behaviours but you can’t reliably read values from behaviours because people may do the same thing for different reasons.

Here are the UK Values Modes proportions for 2016 and 2020 showing an increase in four of the ‘outside edge’ Values Modes (the more ‘values bothered’ ones from the values map), Golden Dreamer and Now People Prospectors, and Concerned Ethical and Transcender Pioneers.  This suggests values-driven national debate is likely to get louder rather than quieter.  UK VMs 2016 and 2020:

Pat Dade writes:

The numbers look more like the pre-crash of 2008 figures than anything since then. It appears that the resilience of the British population is alive and well. Not only have the values of the British population absorbed the structural change to the economy and political changes that followed – they also are becoming more likely to optimistic and open to new experiences than they are to be traumatized and anxious about change.

At CDSM we’ve often been asked over the past few months,  “are the Settlers increasing during the pandemic?”.  Our standard answer is that values don’t change for any one reason and real values shifts take between two and five years from start to finish, and multiple factors have to line up to create a crisis that initiates the change process.

In fact the most common way for the crisis to occur is for existing values-needs to be satisfied.  You are happy but begin to question ‘why?”.  In other words people usually begin their changes from a position of strength, not from a position want and need.

The other less common way people make values changes is when they are consistently unable to meet their dominant needs.  In this case they are beginning a transition from a point of weakness and unmet needs.  In values terms this can even result in Prospectors reverting to being Settlers.

In a short-term situation like the last three to six months we wouldn’t expect change. But the cultural reaction to Covid-19 is having an impact on various aspects of society: lockdowns, no work, new ways of being paid, death, fear of others, uncertainty about the future in multiple ways, etc..  These could increase the likelihood of an unhealthy change.

Years of austerity, a summer of global climate change activism, the final death throes of anti-Brexit demonstrations and the continuing merry-go-around of British governments are also the types of conditions that could trigger an avalanche of negativity and retrogressive values change.

Diagrammatic version of the British Values map 2020:

Thanks to CDSM for sharing these data. Thanks for Mike for pointing out a couple of labelling errors in the original post, now corrected

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Are LCAs Greenwashing Plastic ?

image  Creative Commons 4.0

LCA, Life Cycle Analysis or Assessment, is supposed to be an objective way to compare the environmental footprint of products, and is a mainstay of corporate decision-making in sustainability.  But it’s blind to plastic pollution, leaving it available to be mis-used in comparisons of plastic with other materials.  LCA-based comparisons of plastic bags with other bags for example have been widely cited and give a misleading impression that plastic is ‘greener’, while not assessing plastic as a pollutant at all.

Characterisation of plastic pollution is complex and a relatively new topic but recent work from Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute may enable development of a standard measure of plastic as a persistent and potentially bioaccumulative pollutant.  Meanwhile, campaigners, journalists and environmentalists, as well as scientists who may be commissioned to carry out LCA studies, should be alert to the risk of ‘greenwashing’ plastic through conventional LCAs.  The initial wave of concern heightened by Blue Planet II has subsided but the plastics industry’s fight to rehabilitate itself continues, and with essential uses for PPE at the forefront of covid responses and rock-bottom prices for oil, virgin plastic is cheap and the recycling market has collapsed in many places.  The flood of plastic pollution shows little sign of abating anytime soon.




You may have noticed that despite various ‘bans’ on plastic bags there are quite a lot of media and social media stories in which plastic is compared with alternative materials and plastic is found to be ‘greener’, for example plastic bags compared to cotton bags, or plastic compared to glass or steel bottles.

Track back to the sources of these stories and you usually find they result from a LCA or Life Cycle Analysis or Assessment (for example carrier bags / bottles).  The out-take from these stories generally gets condensed to ‘plastic not so bad after all’, or glass/ paper/ cotton/ aluminium (etc) is ‘actually worse for the environment than plastic – says study’.

BBC World video including a much repeated ‘fact’ that a cotton bag needs to be used 131 times “to have the same environmental impact” as a plastic bag.

Press coverage, even from the BBC’s ‘reality check’ unit, tends to convert assessments into a single dimension such as ‘greener’ or ‘the environmental impact’.  The original factors used for the assessment are often shorn away in the telling of the story, and as it moves along the media chain from the study to the out-take, and through social media. 

(This BBC report cites a LCA report by the Environment Agency for England and Wales on bags available in 2006, published in 2011.  The ‘answer comes down to’ because those were  criteria put into the analysis).

LCAs are widely used in industry and business to try and standardise environmental and sometimes social comparisons between material options, from ‘cradle to grave’.  Some LCAs are bespoke, invented for a particular purpose but many rely on using or adapting an off-the shelf methodology which of course helps with comparability.  LCAs (review article) are required to comply with ISO 14040 guidelines which specify four main stages.

On the face of it, a comparison based on a LCA, with its quantification and set methodology, seems more objective and authoritative than other ways of making a decision.  As they are detailed, and cumbersome and demanding to conduct, they come with an aura of expertise as well as dependability.

But at the moment there is a serious problem in trying to use them to compare plastic with other materials, which at its most basic, is that plastic pollution is invisible to most if not all standard LCAs.

Here for example are the categories used in the EN15804 (a standard for LCAs in the construction sector):

EN15804 – a European standard

If a whale dies from the mechanical obstruction of its organs by ingesting plastic for example, then no matter how many times that is reported in the scientific literature, there is no place for it in most of the impact inventories used to conduct ‘Impact Assessments’ in LCAs. The same would go for seabird or turtle entanglement, or starvation due to ingesting plastic due to mistaking it for food.  If they were poisoned by toxic chemicals released by the plastic that might count but there would need to have commissioned a specific study to produce input data, or that factor would need to appear in a standard reference database such as Ecoinvent.

The obvious large items ‘macro’ and the smaller flakes of ‘meso’ plastic whose impacts created public concern and a little political action through campaigns and programmes like David Attenborough’s Blue Planet II, are simply dismissed as a ‘littering’ problem and not captured in most LCAs.  But there’s more to it than that because ‘microplastic’ is not included either.

In a 2017 blog I argued that policy-makers should treat plastic as a persistent organic pollutant, and regulate for a phase-out except for essential uses.  Several groups of scientists had already made similar calls, pointing to it’s effectively indefinite lifetime, its accumulation in the environment, its roles as a source and vector of toxic substances, and its un-nerving capacity to almost endlessly fragment in the environment.  Since then a growing number of studies have confirmed the omnipresent nature of plastic pollution and it’s ability to travel throughout human and animal bodies, and it’s as yet not-well-defined potential to cause disruption to important cellular mechanisms, suggesting that like forms of radiation, it may have no ‘safe level’ of exposure.

With the possible exception of measures of toxicity derived from substances directly leaching from plastic (freshwater, marine and human health toxicity do routinely feature in LCAs) most of the features of plastic pollution are not accounted for.  So because other factors are included, such as embedded energy costs and emissions like CO2, plastic often looks environmentally better than alternatives.  A glass bottle for example,  will usually have a bigger carbon footprint than a plastic one of the same volume.  Not the same plastic pollution footprint of course but LCAs don’t count the plastic footprint.

As Julien Boucher and colleagues put it in the 2020 IUCN report The Marine Plastic Footprint (p4): 

‘a challenge with LCA methodologies is that they do not account for plastic as a pollutant, but rather only for the indirect effects of plastic use, e.g. depletion of resources, energy consumption, or emission of chemical contaminants. LCA methodologies neither provide an inventory of the marine plastic leakage nor characterise factors to assess the impacts of plastics on ecosystems or human health. This lack of appropriate accounting of plastic leakage has encouraged companies to massively favour plastic packaging in many situations, due to its lightweight nature and low carbon requirements’

Slides from a 2018 presentation by Julien Boucher

The Environment Agency (EA) study cited by the BBC in 2019 for instance (report above) considered Global Warming Potential and ‘other impacts: resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, human toxicity, fresh water aquatic ecotoxicity, marine aquatic ecotoxicity, terrestrial ecotoxicity and photochemical oxidation (smog formation)’ but not the creation, accumulation and effects of plastic as a pollutant.  ‘End of life’ waste management options such as recycling were included but not ‘the effects of littering’ and ‘discharges to water and soil’ were ‘outside the system boundary’. (Studies which identified littering effects were mentioned in an annexe but played no part in the assessment).

The highlighted finding of the study only focused on climate impact and was featured in the only graphic included in the executive summary:


Not surprisingly the point that registered with journalists was the idea that for re-usable cotton bags to have the same environmental impact as ‘disposable’ plastic carrier bags, they would need to be re-used 131 times. 

The study drew on 2006 data and was published in 2011 before the 2017 peak of public concern (see this previous blog) but factoids from such LCA studies are constantly recirculated and most if not all current LCA methodologies still fail to register plastic as a pollutant.

Last October the Dutch-based campaigning NGO Plastic Soup Foundation launched an attack on LCAs, declaring ‘The plastics industry abuses lifecycle analysis (LCA) in communication surrounding plastic pollution’.  It pointed out that LCAs often do not take the end-of-life consequences of a product into account and may make optimistic assumptions about recovery and recycling.  It criticised a recent Dutch industry campaign Plastic Truth versus Plastic Fable for using LCAs as the basis of a claim that plastic bags were more environmentally friendly.

The Foundation noted that on the one hand, LCAs regularly rate plastic as more environmentally friendly while on the other, 80% of plastic ends up as waste in the environment, causing immense harm to marine wildlife. It stated:

‘Industry must, therefore, stop using the current LCA method for promoting single-use packaging plastic in particular. In the meantime, a legitimate supplementary criterion that takes into account the impact plastic has once it inevitably reaches the environment should be agreed upon’.     

A Solution For Plastics in LCAs ?

No such measure has been agreed upon, although in 2019 researchers from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology and the University of Leiden proposed an ‘entanglement factor’.

McHardy et al 2019 proposing a LCA entanglement factor

In 2019 one study took a Spanish LCA assessing different bags and showed that when a ‘pragmatic littering indicator’ was introduced, it produced ‘precisely the opposite’ ranking to when GWP (climate impact) was the main criterion.

From Civancik-Uslu et al 2019 – a littering indicator

More recently, Daniel Maga reported on the work he and colleagues at the Fraunhofer Institute (the German institute for applied science) are undertaking to systematically characterise and quantify the risks attendant on plastic as a pollutant.  Speaking at a virtual conference of Setac in May 2020, Maga gave a presentation on a research methodology for plastic emissions available here in video form.

From Daniel Maga presentation (video) at Setac May 2020

Maga points out that current end of life modelling as used in LCAs does not consider littering or loss of plastics through abrasion or weathering.  He proposes a characterization factor combining fate, exposure, effect and severity and asks how the risks of plastic emissions can be captured in a LCA.  Maga cites the ECHA (European Chemicals Agency) which asserts that there is limited evidence of environmental risks from microplastics and no suggestion of bioaccumulation of hydrophobic organic compounds in organisms (eg many pesticides, PCBs) but also that conventional risk factors may not work with micro or nano plastic risks. He proposes that the ‘fate factor’ is sufficient to capture the main risk from plastics due to their extreme persistence, so they should be treated as a ‘non-threshold substance’ in a similar way to PBTs (persistent, bio accumulative and toxic substances) for which any release can be assumed to create a risk. This is a classic case in which the Precautionary Principle should be applied (there being a priori reason to act even without definitive evidence of the impact having already occurred).

Detailed characterisation of plastic pollution is a formidable task.   Maga goes on to itemise a mind-numbing welter of technical challenges.  To deal with these in a way that could be included in a LCA, he proposes calculation of plastic equivalents, homing in on a SDR or ‘Specific Surface Degradation Rate’ measure, published in February.   (How micro-plastics degrade is strongly dependent on shape – watch the presentation for details)

Where’s this going? If used, such an approach would enable decision-makers such as government agencies to compare and regulate plastics according to their risk as driven by fate-factors such as persistence.

Maga says “we imagine” it generating tables such as this one for macroplastic emissions (based on estimates from the plastikbudget project in Germany), showing rates of loss, where they are (environmental ‘compartments’ such as soil or water), type of plastic, degradation rates, SDR, length and shape:

And the same for microplastics

If a system like this were to be adopted by decision-makers, it could enable fairer and more realistic LCA comparisons, and help prioritise regulatory action as well as choices within companies.  In theory possible that a country like the UK or more realistically the US, could do this alone but both are seriously weakened in terms of capability by a decade or more of environmental back-pedalling and hollowing out of expertise in central government and agencies.   The EU, probably led by the economic and scientific powerhouse of Germany, is probably the main hope for scientific R & D in tacking the plastics crisis.

Beware The LCA

In the meantime, environmental correspondents, NGOs and campaigners need to be wary of LCAs.  They should check the methodologies behind any claims to compare the ‘green-ness’ or ‘environmental impact’ of plastics and alternative materials, particularly where data has been fed into the blender of a LCA to give a ‘simple’ result.

Although it may be a big ask for researchers hungry for money, scientists asked to conduct similar studies should also ask themselves why they are being commissioned, and whether the framing that a brief will create, is designed in advance to greenwash plastic by what is included or excluded.

Cognitive Biases

Researchers should also be careful about the way findings are converted into everyday  terms. One example of framing and possible inbuilt cognitive bias is use of the ‘number of times you’d have to use a bag’ metric.  This may seem innocuous but it positions a large number against a small number by taking as its ‘impact’ reference point the ‘footprint’ of a single plastic bag (excluding the plastic pollution impact), and comparing it to a different type of bag (eg cotton) and then working out how many times the for example cotton bag ‘would need to be used’ to ‘be as good as’ the plastic bag.  The UK EA 2006/2011 study mentioned earlier calculated 131 times and the 2018 Danish study found (p 80) ‘conventional cotton carrier bags should be reused at least 50 times before being disposed of; organic cotton carrier bags should be reused 150 times based on their environmental production cost’.

What this does is to frame the consumer choice in terms of effort required in order to get the reward of being environmentally friendly.  Either use a disposable plastic bag, or you have to go shopping with a cotton bag 130-150 times!  Can you imagine – (your brain does that instantly without you thinking it through) – it’s just not feasible is it?  This invokes the anchoring heuristic: the busy (time-pressed, time-is-a-scarce-commodity) shopper is given the first single-action choice as a reference point (the anchor) and the second (131x) action) to compare to it, just in order to get the same reward.  It’s a no-brainer that plastic is the more feasible choice.

The focal effect in this snap judgement also stops us asking awkward questions like “how many times can you actually re-use a cotton bag anyway ?”  I have no idea but some suggest durable bags can be re-used 500 times. Think of other items made out of cotton (requires a frame-change).  Would you be satisfied with a cotton shirt or pair of trousers than could not be worn for at least 131 days, and would it ‘make more sense’ to replace them with 131 pairs of disposable plastic trousers if they had a lower carbon footprint?

Even setting aside the omission of the very reason plastic needs to be assessed – plastic pollution – and any other doubts that might exist about the assumptions made about non-plastic choices in these studies, the cognitive behavioural bias of the framing is clear.  Try thinking about it the other way around.  “What’s better, to use just one cotton bag for your daily shopping over the next four months, or 131 plastic bags which you then throw away?”  ‘Obviously’ the re-usable bag is an environmentally better choice.  Now the effort implication of the cotton bag has disappeared and you are triggered to think about environmental responsibility by being reminded that these are ‘disposable’ short-lifetime plastic bags.  Picture that huge pile of waste plastic bags.

In a fleeting mental encounter with such a study factoid, as in watching a 30 second news clip, another mental bias is triggered, which is WYSIATI ‘what you see is all there is’.  The ‘issue’ captured is the story is the choice between two bags.

Other possible redesign options or behaviours, sometimes mentioned in the fine-print of LCA studies, are not shown and thus do not exist in the mental processing.  Using a wheeled shopping basket for example (no bags needed), or a rucksack you already own and also use for other purposes, or re-using a carboard box the store provides, or a host of other possible options that might resolve the ‘bag problem’.

The focus is kept restricted to the plastic bag v other bag, as in a ‘horse-race poll’ in politics where prospective voters are only asked about the ‘two main candidates’ and not the five others running, so they disappear from view in stories reporting the result of the poll, triggering voters to make an instant mental choice between the two candidates featured, not the total seven.

That device is popular with larger political parties. Restricting the focus and terms of a LCA-based study can enable those with a vested commercial interest in say, plastic, to generate seemingly scientific, impartial and ‘objective’ findings that happen to show their product in a good light.

‘Gold Standard’

No wonder perhaps that the plastics industry loves LCAs as they stand at the moment.    The British Plastics Federation website states: ‘They are as close to the gold standard of understanding the environmental consequences of a product as researchers can currently get’.

Imagine you are in the driving seat of the ‘public affairs’ strategy for the plastics industry, or its Siamese Twin the oil and gas industry.  How would your situation report go? Maybe something like this:


Covid has brought mixed blessings but generally things still look good. The vast majority is still made from oil or gas and despite the response to Blue Planet II, plastics use worldwide is still increasing and rapidly risingin Europe.  Pressure to cut carbon emissions is a problem but it can be turned to advantage if plastic can be positioned as greener than alternatives in energy terms. Unfortunately one side-effect of Blue Planet II and the associated wave of campaigning was the introduction of bans and restrictions on high profile ‘single use plastic’ such as bags, starting in Europe and spreading around the world.  

A 2019 European Environment Agency review of the measures taken by European countries to reduce the plastics problem found revealed that 37 of the 173 measures identified were market based and most ‘referred to fees for plastic carrier bags’.   We can live with those but the real risk is if the same political thinking behind them (respond to popular sentiment against plastic) spreads to the rest of the packaging market and other uses. We particularly need to keep politicians thinking bout plastic as an issue that can be solved by better waste management and more consumer commitment to recycling, and not ‘phase-outs’.  This is why it’s even now important to discredit the ‘bag bans’ as an irrational and regrettable reflex, not borne out by ‘the science’.

Some good news is that the more scientific end of the media covering environmental issues is particularly motivated to encourage ‘rational’ rather than ‘emotional’ environmentalism, which means they have an appetite for the quantified and factual.  Here LCAs are our friend as they generate factual proofs that plastic can be the better environmental choice. 

Take for example the British popular science publication New Scientist. In 2015 it carried an article ‘Plastic Bag Levy Is A Drop in the Ocean On Environmental Grounds’:

Its life cycle analysis of a number of different types of shopping bags found that a cotton bag would have to be used 131 times to be below the total global warming potential of an HDPE bag used only once. And once you factor in reuse of HDPE bags as bin liners, which is reasonably common, this reuse factor rises. The point made by the study is that the global warming impact of HDPE bags is negligible

It’s good to be able to report that New Scientist went on to cite that 131-times fact at least twice more in 2018,  in an article advising its readers (May 2018):

and in a Leader (June 2018):

The LCA 131-times example has been repeated many times, for example here in The Conversation, here in Stamford Magazine, here in Earth Times, and here in Business Insider, all channels likely to reach this ‘Rational-Environmental’ audience.  There is no way we can make plastic popular with all the public but we don’t need to – to paraphrase Frank Luntz on climate, we just need to maintain doubt about alternatives, while we keep on growing.


That’s enough of the imaginary report.  I freely admit that my view of the activities of the plastics industry is somewhat jaundiced as a result of seeing some of its lobbying activities and the way, for example, that it used the ‘litter’ frame from the 1970s onwards (see A Beautiful But Evil Strategy) to prevent people seeing plastic as a pollutant, and still uses today.  It’s in the industry’s interests to see these misleading ‘factoids’ derived from LCAs in wide circulation, spreading like memes.

Even better than having them repeated in a ‘straight’ science magazine like the New Scientist is if the pro-plastic LCA findings are endorsed by re-appearing in publications from environmental organisations themselves.   This can happen when ‘green’ groups are engaged in projects framed by environmental waste ‘management’ assumptions, and are trying to optimise choices from inside the status quo, rather than to change the strategic drivers.  The ‘circular economy’ community is particularly vulnerable.

For example in 2020 the UK group the Green Alliance published a report Plastic Promises: What The Grocery Sector Is Really Doing About Packaging for its Circular Economy Task Force  whose members are the corporates PwC, Kingfisher, Viridor, Walgreens Boots Alliance, SUEZ recycling and recovery UK, and Veolia.   It noted:

Given the demand for change since the BBC’s Blue Planet II aired in 2017, and the promises that have been made since, one might have expected a considerable market shift away from plastic by now, at least for packaging in the grocery sector.  There have been some minor changes … but, overall, the proportion of plastic packaging seen on most supermarket shelves, and the amount collected as waste and reported to the Environment Agency, has not altered significantly.

Based on anonymous interviews within the sector, author Libby Peake reported that despite one of the supermarkets reporting a ‘ferocious’ anti-plastic response from consumers with an 800% increase in customer queries, actual behaviour change was limited. Professionals such as brand managers cited a host of frustrations, from dubious brand claims to unintended consequences of switches, inadequate recycling (Britain is a mess) and difficulties sourcing recycled material.

The Green Alliance study was no doubt conducted with the best of intentions but the conventional plastics-dominated packaging industry will have been delighted that it also  repeated as fact the LCA-based findings from ‘a 2011 study for the Northern Ireland Assembly … that paper bags generally require four times as much energy to manufacture as plastic bags’ and the Danish study which ‘concluded that … a paper bag would need to be reused 43 times to have a lower impact than the average plastic bag’.

The plastics industry PRs will also have appreciated the headline “we can’t just replace plastics” quoting Libby Peake in an interview about the study with the Packaging Europe (used in its weekly newsletter).


A Question of Strategy


The real issue for change groups in relation to LCAs is one of strategy: what are you trying to achieve and by what steps will that come about?   The above quote from the packaging industry magazine asserts that climate change is ‘an even more serious problem’ than ‘plastic’.   In what sense?  What does this mean?  From whose point of view?

As Green Alliance’s report records, most people (public in the UK) in fact reject the implied trade-off and think that climate and plastic are of equal importance. If you asked ‘experts’, then with all sorts of caveats, they would probably give you a similar answer.  But if you asked about a specific case, as in for example choices about bags or bottles, you might get a different answer depending on people’s understanding and how they assume change can happen on either ‘issue’.

In the end a LCA essentially constructs a two dimensional rating by adding up the results of a set of scores to enable rankings from best to worst.   In my view, change strategy has to be at least three dimensional.  One tool I developed for doing this in relation to potential campaign targets is the ‘ambition box’.  It has three axes, the hardness or difficulty of a change target,  the size of that target (how much of the problem it represents), and the significance of the target (the consequential effects or potentiation resulting from the achievement of the target).

Ambition Box from How To Win Campaigns edn 2

Problem management logic is mainly dictated by the first two axes.  For example it would make sense to start with the ‘lowest hanging fruit’, the biggest soft and easy target first.  Strategic change logic is mainly dictated by significance.  LCA is fundamentally a tool for problem management (eg making optimal choices at one level which are all sub-optimal options in the ‘bigger picture’), not strategic change.  An exception, as has been argued above, is that it can be mis-used to obstruct strategic change.

Put this another way: with a wicked global problem like climate change or plastic pollution, we need a strategy to ultimately eliminate the problem not just manage it.  This is why campaign groups and now most governments are trying to eliminate fossil fuels from the energy system, not just increase energy efficiency, and why human-made industrial greenhouse gases like HFCs need to be simply phased out completely and replaced with alternatives, not just reduced to a particular level or ‘so far as possible’.

Plastic made from oil or gas is important as a direct contributor to climate change (the carbon gets released adding to environmental CO2) but its not as important as getting to zero carbon energy across industry, transport or electricity generation, which would ‘deal with’ all the energy related ‘carbon problem’ behind production of all sorts of bags, bottles and so on.  So the carbon footprint of plastic is not necessarily an ‘even more important’ problem if looking at say packaging, than plastic pollution is.  On the other hand, packaging certainly is the major source of plastic pollution, along with tyre wear.  So for plastic pollution these are strategic targets, requiring substitution, or ‘replacing plastic’ within a regulated phase-out, excepting essential uses.

Naive Rationalists

LCAs are simply not set up to make (or even really facilitate) such judgements but this may not be widely understood by many of those who use them on a regular basis.  Others may be ‘naive rationalists’, naive about the way LCAs are easily mis-used to ‘game the system’ and attracted to what seems a ‘rational calculus’ defining ‘the right answer’.

This is what Michael Warhurst, a UK chemicals expert and Executive Director of ChemTrust told me about LCAs:

LCAs are a nightmare, as it is easy to get the answer you want & ultimately the data & assumptions that they are based on are very poor. On chemicals, for example, they use old databases and assumptions while REACH is constantly identifying new problems & also finding that know problem chemicals are active at lower levels.

I think for an effective assessment you have to disaggregate different elements & create a system that is as transparent as possible…

I don’t think LCAs will ever be satisfactory, but they are popular as an apparent ’simple’ solution – they are fine to use within an organisation if you know what you want and are comparing options, but they are terrible for policymaking in a wider sense”.

Of course there are many possible dimensions of significance.  One of the psychological-political ones is public resonance and iconography.  Plastic bags and bottles now fall into this category, which is one reason why politicians took some sort of action on those, and why old LCA-factoids on bags and bottles keep being put back into the public conversation.

Some of those involved with LCAs rightly point out that they were not supposed to be used to form policy but when their results derive from assessments which manifestly fail to capture key environmental impacts, and are designed in a way that gives a stamp of green approval to plastic, and these are put into the public domain, they can of course affect politics and policy.

Finally, a question for those pursuing the ‘Circular Economy’ is what are the steps by which it can actually be brought about, and are any of these strategic ?  If not, you may remain trapped inside a universe of many small sub-optimal choices which you are trying to use to change drivers that are being set by the strategies of others, such as the plastics and oil industries.


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10 Things About Covid And Campaigns

Here are a few thoughts about coronavirus and Covid-19. They are coloured by being written from a British perspective. I’ve tried to stick to things that may be generally applicable and haven’t written much about health and social care systems as they will doubtless be subject to evidence-based reviews, as well as campaigns and lobbying with a mixture of influences from national self-interest  to philanthropy.  I’ll try to write a more detailed post on one or two aspects soon.  I’ll start with the most obvious.

  1. It Is Significant

Be prepared to rewrite all your strategies in the coming year or so, and probably more than once. Former US Treasury Secretary Laurence Summers, has called coronavirus a ‘hinge in history’.  Writing in the FT he said:

‘The Covid-19 crisis is the third major shock to the global system in the 21st century, following the 2001 terror attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. I suspect it is by far the most significant’. 

‘9/11’ and the 2008 recession will, he argues, ‘fade over time from popular memory’ but coronavirus will not.  Like Munich in 1938, the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and the 1929 crash of the stock market, it’s significance will lie in what happens next.

He’s probably right, and we don’t know what happens next but one might think about it in three big ‘buckets’: the impacts of the pandemic itself, in waves or as a chronic problem or both; the consequences of lockdown and other direct national government responses; and those of the recession, possibly depression, which is now unfolding.


  1. Values Differences Will Be In Play

A sign that appeared near the end of my road

The more severe and sustained the sense of threat the more we all embrace Settler-type priorities: safety, security, belonging.  As Guardian journalist Nick Cohen wrote in a critique of the Boris Johnson government’s response

‘the British were locking themselves down days before the government finally accepted the realities of the pandemic. We did so because one aspect of human behaviour remains predictable: we don’t want to die’.

So if you now have society-wide visions for ‘post-covid’ society, the broad order of priority to gain social and political space and traction is first Settler, second Prospector, third, Pioneer priorities: meaning the tests are (does it help?) lives and safety, then jobs, opportunities and prosperity, then the bigger picture and a better ‘new normal’.  I’ll unpack this in a longer post but the ‘values rules’ in the 2008 blog ‘Campaigning Your Way Out Of Recession’ broadly apply.

An interesting minor values tweak is that Britain’s Boris Johnson is now on the horns of a bit of a values dilemma, having successfully united libertarian Pioneers and security driven Settlers in opposition to the EU over Brexit, and is now experiencing their opposing reflexes over relaxation of the covid lockdown: much the same dynamic that Pat Dade wrote about dividing the US Tea Party.

  1. Political Lessons Will Be Drawn

National politicians will also be anxious about survival, prosperity and vision: especially their own.  The first round contest will be virus related: the excess deaths in national epidemics.  Some will be judged to have had a good outbreak – probably New Zealand, maybe South Africa, so far South Korea. Others, at present led by countries like the UK but maybe to be eclipsed by the US, a disastrous one.  The second round is underway and concerns lockdown and management measures and will be a blame-game war.  The third will be about political ideas and models (ie political fashion).

UK PM Boris Johnson is unlikely to become an international political role model on covid.  He has managed the unlikely feat of uniting right and left wing commentators (here Piers Morgan and John Sweeney, May 19) in criticism.  62,000 dead is closing on the 67,000 civilians who died in Britain WW2.

Will a green sustainable recovery be the new big default idea?  Will populist nationalist isolationism and exceptionalism (as per Johnson, Trump) be seen to have succeeded or failed?  Will we (politicians) “all be interventionists now”?  Or will neoliberalism survive in a form of New Interventionism?  Maybe none of these but a new default truism is very likely. It will be chosen by politicians based on what is seen to have worked in political terms.

  1. New Behaviours Will Outlast Interruption Better Than New Ideas

It’s well known that unavoidable interruption of an old behaviour is one of the most powerful factors facilitating the uptake of a new behaviour.  People then take on ‘new ideas’ which are rationalisations of their new behaviours.  They are much less likely to take a new idea, rationalise it and so adopt a new behaviour. So while ‘lockdown’ is a massive interruption of business as usual and one of its effects is to give people interested in issues a lot of time and space to come up with new ideas, few of them are likely to lead to sustained new behaviours if they have not become established by the time a ‘new normal’ sets in.

This is why it was a canny move for city mayors to quickly start narrowing streets for cars to give more space for social distancing among pedestrians and to allow more cycling.  Once locked in, such changes are unlikely to be reversed.  The message for campaigns is ‘act now’.

Many people in developed countries have experienced increased awareness of nature and a cleaner environment during lockdown but unless this new perspective is translated into behaviours that outlast relaxation of lockdown it may evaporate, leaving just a wistful memory.


  1. Some Things Will Die Or Never Recover

Not just people but businesses and whole economic sectors and while countries may not ‘die’ some may not recover at least for generations.  Custom and finance is the lifeblood of business and if the drought is too long, businesses die and if enough die, sectors vanish, other things attract the money, and grow in their place.  These ‘structural’ changes are mostly independent of individual behaviour change but will change ‘choice architecture’. Some will create windows of opportunity for change in the public interest, others may close off funding streams to NGOs.

When Zoom was reported to be worth more than seven of the world’s largest airlines combined, and Shell cut its dividend for the first time since WW2,  it made headlines around the world.  Set alongside widespread working from home and reports of companies seeing no fall in productivity, and struggling airlines, it’s easy to imagine that global tourism as well as business air travel and the market for conventional office space could be severely impacted.   On May 1 the FT reported that a PwC survey found 25% of CFOs were ‘already thinking of cutting back on real estate’ and half of US office searches were on hold.  Convert unwanted office space to renewably powered vertical farms? 

  1. A Green Recovery Is Not Inevitable

A chorus of calls from economists (eg Joseph Stiglitz and 200 others), often echoed by financial commentators, have endorsed the idea of a ‘green recovery’.  They want governments to take the dislocation effect of shut-down and the increased appetite for intervention as an opportunity to speed up a green transition and discourage fossil fuel use.  In April the EC’s Frans Timmermans pledged that all EU covid-recovery spend will be green, and the French government tied airline support to cutting carbon emissions.

From the FT

But quiet fossil fuel lobbying may be having a big effect behind the scenes.

The UK has just approved the largest new gas-power station in Europe and eight EU states have voiced support for the “role of natural gas in a climate-neutral Europe”.  As it stands, environmentalists will no doubt win the ‘air war’ on this but may lose the ground war inside governments.

Adding more fact-filled arguments from economists in favour of a green recovery may make no difference. Qualitative research to translate the very Track 2 analytical arguments of learned economists into Track 1 intuitively understandable public propositions would be a good and urgently-needed investment.  (And a lockdown is a very good time to do such research as respondents are more available online or by phone).

  1. There Will Be Idiosyncratic Winners

We may come to remember the pandemic by some singular but for now esoteric changes, such as emblematic technologies, like the ‘non-stick frying pans’ (not now seen as a great thing environmentally) cited as a ‘spin-off’ from the Space Race.  Copper is perhaps too obvious an example.  Whereas in one study Covid-19 survived for up to three days on plastic or stainless steel, it lasted only four hours on copper.  The metal (and to an extent alloys like brass) has been known as a cleaning agent for centuries and kills bacteria such as MRSA.  Expect to see a (return-to) trend for copper on high-touch surfaces like handrails in hospitals and mass transit. ‘world’s first anti-microbial copper train’

HEPA filters and personalised air space in public auditoria, ships and aircraft might be another, and of course a whole string of redesigns in hospitals (a comeback for physical isolation hospitals?) and in health settings. But it will probably be something else that gets remembered as an ‘explainer’, probably something that becomes familiar and needs an orgin, or something that vanished ‘because of covid’. Some suggest it will be e-bikes.

  1. Knowledge Politics May Finally Be Plucked From Obscurity

Because the pandemic has dominated news coverage for such an extended period and the virus is an invisible foe understandable only through science, normally obscure areas of study such as epidemiology and the nature of scientific ‘uncertainty’ have been gradually exposed to wider audiences.

Covid has tested the relationship between science and politics. The UK and US have struggled because Johnson and Trump have cultivated a populist base fed on simple solutions to complex problems.  Covid trapped them both in an issue where evidence could not be gainsaid by using values dog-whistles, and unlike Germany’s Angela Merkel, both floundered.


Merkel covid lockdown strategy explainer  subtitled by The Guardian

Trump’s wildly erratic positions on covid have been partly driven by his frustration with unavoidable engagement with the alien rules of science.  Johnson’s slow response to covid which lost time and cost lives was underpinned by his conflicting commitment to the Brexit project, for which the chief risk was probably seen as a recession, and in which rejection of expert advice was a core selling point.

Michael Gove explains why we don’t want experts, during the Brexit campaign 

In the UK, ‘scientific expertise’ has had to be politically rehabilitated by Johnson at least for theatrical purposes, with government scientists pushed forwards in press briefings like the shield-wall of Roman testudo (tortoise), designed to deflect incoming fire.

David Frei, Wiki,  Creative Commons – Roman Testudo

Boris Johnson flanked by Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer (left) and Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific Adviser at a press briefing (photo

Johnson’s pact with science may break down as details emerge in any forthcoming Public Inquiry but reliance on science is unavoidable in many other ‘issues’ where risks exist that are hard if not impossible to understand or even recognize without scientific knowledge. Modern politicians need the ability to interpret and evaluate that knowledge, it’s force and its limitations.  GM crops, nuclear waste and radiation, fine-particle air pollution, climate change and the emerging debates about the social risks and benefits of AI are all examples of such ‘risk politics’.  Ulrich Beck may finally be discovered by the Anglo political class.

  1. Zoonoses and Changing Perspectives

Ebola, bird flu, swine flu, rabies, HIV and covid-19 are all ‘zoonoses’ or animal diseases that jump species. It’s a moot point whether politicians will now come to terms with the reality that while these are inevitable (and the ultimate source of many human diseases), if we are to avoid a series of ‘disease-X’ pandemics like the current corona-virus, we need to stop the expansion of human settlement into what remains of natural ecosystems.   Over a million candidate viruses are out there in nature.

This is a messy, granular, diverse, difficult problem, multiplied by the fact that the first human hosts are usually the poor and dispossessed: all good reasons, in normal times, for most politicians to try and ignore it.  Are there political leaders who can change that? I hope so.  A lot has been written about this and more will follow.  This short piece is one of the best.


Note that it although not exactly a ‘popular’ piece, it follows the values priority sequence outlined in #2.

To enable politicians to get traction with this issue it seems to me that campaigners and popularising scientists need to find a frame which nails down a category of interactions in time and space as the definition of the problem.  As well as disruption of nature such as in encroachment on forests, this has to include intensive animal farming and wildlife trade, both human-made laboratories for uncontrolled transmission.  Simley Evans of the University of California calls them ‘spillover events’ – so we need action on Spillover Zones ?  See more at and this article.

In different dimensions, in some countries the impact of covid may provoke a re-evaluation of how we deal with age and the value of life.  Another effect has been to make many people in rich countries reassess what’s ‘essential’, particularly ‘essential work’.  Once the top priority is survival, food, health care, water, power and law and order suddenly seem much more important. Yet we discover that our ‘Essential Workers’ are all too often also classified as ‘unskilled’, are low paid, low status and insecure.

Could covid prove to be a social reformer, the twenty-first century equivalent of Charles Dickens?     Where Dickens exposed the inequities of industrialising C19th Britain, in some rich countries the impact of coronavirus is exposing the inequitable arrangements of post-industrial nations.  A great many of us have become used to high personal discretionary spending.  It has come at many costs including to our common environment and the working poor. If covid is to provoke social reform, it will need a story-teller on a par with Dickens.

From The Independent.  Picture of unsustainable prosperity quarantined by covid?

  1. Extinction of Rebellion ?

A curious side effect of ‘covid’ has been the effective silencing of protest by Extinction Rebellion, which last year seemed almost omnipresent.  As I explored in a previous blog – probably at too great a length – this may be no bad thing.  The original XR strategy, while brilliant in some ways, was also fatally flawed and ran a real risk of becoming counter productive.  The ‘movement’ needed time to rethink and was busy doing that when covid struck.  New social priorities and then social distancing put XR effectively on hold, and also removed Greta Thunberg from the headlines (perhaps a good thing for her too in the short term).

Of course climate change has not gone away and the spectacular fall in carbon emissions caused by lockdown has made no impact on rising carbon levels in the atmosphere – a salutary indication of the huge task we have yet to seriously start on if we are to tackle the climate threat.

Slide from a Carbon Brief webinar – the (top end estimate) 8% ‘covid windfall’ decline in 2020 emissions would need to be repeated every year for a decade in order to hit the ‘safe’ 1.5.C temperature-rise limit.  In an optimistic reading there is a good chance that emissions may have peaked in 2019.

What’s needed to make this happen?  Many things but one of them is concerted and direct engagement between civil society actors such as campaign groups, possibly also the ‘new climate movement’, and the carbon-cutting industries, and politicians.  That requires focused pressure to implement practical solutions, not just protest by disruption.



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Beyond Zero – No Heathrow #3 Plots New Course For Climate Policies

Today (27 Feb 2020) a decision by the UK’s ‘Court of Appeal’ found that the UK Government’s approval for expansion of flying capacity at Heathrow Airport through at third runway was illegal because of it’s failure to consider the meaning of the Paris agreement in climate change.

What  ?

Essentially this happened because more runway capacity would mean more flights and more flights means more climate-changing ‘carbon pollution’ when the UK and other countries are committed to much less.  In the case of the UK and others, net zero by 2050.  This comes at a moment when, as many have pointed out, the “net zero” horizon has galvanised thinking on the practical steps needed to address the Climate Emergency.

In this case the technical problem is that commercial aircraft rely on high-crabon kerosene and there is no ready alternative in mass production.  Opponents of a Third Runway at LHR were rightly jubilant – the decision followed decades of opposition from groups like HACANStop Heathrow Expansion, Plane Stupid, local authorities, local communities and London’s mayors, and no less than five judicial reviews (UK legal challenges), with a final challenge mounted by a group including Greenpeace, Friends Of The Earth, Plan B, and London Mayor Sadiq Khan.

Why Is This Significant ?

There are three reasons why this is important.

First, it shows that the Paris Agreement had legal practical consequences in a democracy held to account by an independent judiciary.  Anyone who thinks that government commitments have no useful consequence should consider this.

Second, it demonstrates how long-running, hard-grind campaigns are necessary to produce practical results with ground-breaking implications.  The recent activities of Extinction Rebellion and others have played a part but the war of attrition led by groups like HACAN have kept the game in play.  Which is why, as argued in a previous blog, all these groups need to organise to focus on strategic targets rather than hope that a self-starting bottom-up movement of lots of small actions against a diverse smorgasboard of particular climate hates, can lead to a coherent shift in direction.

Third, because by 2050 it is very possible that net-zero aviation fuels and technologies will be available, for politicians it opens up a new policy framing, of “Beyond Zero” policies.

In this case, meaning that in so far as climate emissions are concerned (notwithstanding other legitimate objections to Heathrow expansion, of which there are many), the option of a Third LHR Runway should be put in a box labelled “Post Zero”: not-to-be-opened until aviation is net carbon zero (or preferably True Zero).  That might be pre-2050 but until that is achieved, and flying is no longer a climate-threat, airport expansion should not be allowed a hearing, end of story.

For more – see these stories:

 Standing outside the courthouse on Thursday in the rain, climate activist Zack Polanski said that those who had campaigned tirelessly for years to block expansion plans were jubilant but aware that there “is still much work to do.”

“The argument has to be loud and clear that we’re living in a climate emergency, and it must be no to all airport expansions,” Polanski said, adding that other governments around the world could learn from the ruling. “If you sign the Paris agreement, it has to mean something.”

Experts said the courts were effectively saying that, like it or not, domestic climate laws are real and need to be factored into policy decisions.

“The government lawyers said that they didn’t need to take into account the Paris agreement, and judges today said, ‘Oh, yes you do,’?” said Doug Parr, chief scientist at Greenpeace UK. He added that this “opens new legal territory” and that “future decisions will need to take into account the Paris agreement targets, or they will be potentially judicable.” …

Friends of the Earth, one of the claimants in the case, said the ruling was a “ground-breaking result for climate justice and for future generations.” 

Heathrow airport expansion ruled illegal on climate change grounds

The UK government’s decision to allow a third runway to be built at London’s Heathrow airport has been found to be illegal because of its failure to consider the Paris climate deal.

The court of appeal has ruled that the government’s plans for a third runway at Heathrow failed to consider the UK’s commitments to reduce carbon emissions under the Paris agreement. It’s the latest twist in a saga that has been rumbling on for well over 10 years. Every step of the way, Greenpeace and many other groups – including HACANStop Heathrow Expansion, local authorities, local communities and London’s mayors – have sought to block a new runway.

So what does this new ruling mean for the third runway and the climate crisis? 

What’s happened?

In 2018, the government released the Airports National Policy Statement which explicitly backed a third runway at Heathrow airport. This was despite previous commitments from David Cameron when he was prime minister that there would be no third runway.

Campaign groups opposed to airport expansion – including Greenpeace – responded with a series of judicial reviews, no less than five of them. These challenged the decision on various grounds, such as air pollution, noise pollution and traffic increases.

These cases were initially dismissed by the high court. But today’s ruling comes from the court of appeal, which found that the government didn’t take into account its commitments under the global Paris agreement to reduce emissions. Paris of course being the agreement, currently between every country on earth, to dramatically reduce carbon emissions in order to keep global temperature increases below 1.5ºC.

This decision is monumental.

The future of Heathrow’s new runway is now uncertain after judges at the Court of Appeal ruled that the government must reconsider its support for a third runway because of the environmental impact. The Court of Appeal concluded that the former Secretary of State for Transport Chris Grayling failed to take account of the government’s commitments to tackling climate change when setting out support for the project in a National Policy Statement (NPS). The appeal was brought by a group of councils in London affected by the expansion, environmental charities including Greenpeace, Friends Of The Earth and Plan B, and London Mayor Sadiq Khan.

 Lord Justice Lindblom told a packed court: “The Paris Agreement ought to have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in the preparation of the NPS and an explanation given as to how it was taken into account, but it was not.”

He said that, having seen the decision in advance, the Government did not oppose a declaration that the NPS was unlawful and has not sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The ruling means that current Transport Secretary Grant Shapps will have to review the NPS to ensure it accords with the Government’s commitments on climate change. 

Heathrow Airport has said it will appeal the ruling in the Supreme Court. 

John Sauven, executive director of Greenpeace UK, said: “Boris Johnson should now put Heathrow out of its misery and cancel the third runway once and for all. No ifs, no buts, no lies, no U-turns.”

John Stewart, who chairs anti-expansion group Hacan, said: “This ruling has killed off the third runway for good.

“Although it invites the Government to review its policy, I suspect that the current Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, doesn’t want to review the policy and will use this as a way of killing off the third runway.”



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Tragedy or Scandal ? Strategies Of Extinction Rebellion and Greta Thunberg

The ‘new climate movement’ including the Green New Deal, Greta Thunberg,  #fridaysforfuture and the ‘school strikes’ and Extinction Rebellion now dominate media conversations about climate change, the climate crisis and the climate emergency.  What may their future hold, what have they achieved and can their efforts now align with those of more established actors to maximum effect ?

I’ve explored these questions in a paper which I’m afraid is rather long but which campaign strategists, climate campaigners and others involved in actively trying to address the climate crisis may find interesting:  Tragedy Or Scandal? Strategies Of GT, XR and the New Climate Movement (pdf)

I’m one of millions, perhaps billions of people who admire what they have achieved and hope they will continue to find success, for it’s in all our interests that they do. But I also have questions and doubts about some of the strategies and tactics of Extinction Rebellion, and ‘XR UK’ in particular.  (For reasons of time and capacity and the fact that they are more straightforward, I’ve not focused on the Green New Deal initiatives, although they are extremely important.  My take on XR is also based on XR UK in 2018 and 2019, and may not apply to other parts of XR).

Some of the points I explore include:

Differences in the strategies and objectives between XR and ‘GT’ (including the school strikes).  Although many supporters may not realise it, XR has had revolutionary objectives (overthrow of government) and has adopted an ingenious but I think deeply flawed strategy of escalation of mass civil disobedience based on a probable mis-application of analysis of revolutionary movements in totalitarian regimes and dictatorships (the questionable ‘magical 3.5%’ participation), whereas it is actually operating in open democracies.  GT on the other hand has the more transparent objective of pressuring governments to adopt measures in line with achieving the Paris Agreement commitments to hold greenhouse gas emissions to levels consistent with 1.5 or 2C, by advocacy, school striking and protest.

The way both XR and GT have woven narratives that ‘nothing is being done’ and ‘nothing has worked’ whereas in fact there are many proven solutions to climate-changing pollution in the shape of technologies, policies and practices, it’s just that they have not been tried often enough and hard enough.  I argue that GT should retire these claims, and criticise XR in particular for systematic ‘solutions denial‘.

Denying solutions is not only not ‘telling the truth’ as XR urges on others but is ultimately counter-productive because it means GT and XR forgo the opportunity to force faster progress on governments and push out problems with solutions, by using the scandal dynamic.  If ‘nothing can be done’ then however awful the problem may be, it’s just a tragedy.  If it’s avoidable, it’s a scandal.  I argue that this is pivotal strategy issue and that working on such objectives from now on, could enable XR and GT to align their efforts with the larger established efforts of NGOs, greenish politicians, businesses and many others in civil society.

Bizarrely, solutions denial puts XR on the side of climate deniers who are also invariably active solutions-deniers.

XR has been systematic in misrepresenting what scientists are saying by editing out any hopeful parts of their papers in their presentations to potential recruits and to followers: it’s guilty of ‘gloom-picking‘ rather than ‘cherry-picking’ the science.  It has presented most science about right on the problem-driving side (and GT more so) although it has sometimes played fast and loose with attribution, for example not making clear the difference between speculation and science with a high degree of agreement, and has sometimes made things up.  These are un-necessary self-inflicted weaknesses which it should avoid.

Economic forms of rebellion and a focus on fossil fuel interests rather than just street-blocking actions could help XR in its revised strategy.  If it is to succeed it will need broad public support rather than just relying on a small vanguard of self-sacrificing activism.  Based on its trajectory in 2018 and 2019, XR UK runs the risk of dividing and polarising public opinion along values lines, re-opening the ‘Brexit’ values schism and potentially achieving stasis rather than rapid transitional change.

XR has deliberately encouraged and magnified gloom and climate-grief to up the emotional engagement of recruits and encourage them into committing arrestable actions.  In my view this approach is unethical as well as likely to fail but along the way it may also do real damage to people’s mental well-being, especially the young.

Because both XR and GT have reached and very successfully mobilised new audiences with little background in the climate issue, they are particularly vulnerable to the sort of cynical climate populism deployed by XR UK.  For example, it gives the impression that UK government policies have made no difference whereas carbon emissions have been falling since 1973, the UK’s carbon footprint is shrinking and electricity decarbonisation has been dramatic.  17 other industrial countries likewise have falling emissions.  In XR’s alternative reality this does not exist and this pretence will not help XR push governments into achieving more.  Blocking roads puts no direct pressure on inadequate climate policy.

In the UK XR has repeatedly dismissed the efforts of NGO campaigns and over-inflated its own achievements but in reality it is the direct beneficiary of 30 or more years of campaigning and change.  For example the university fossil fuel divestment campaigns and Friends of the Earth’s success in creating the UK Climate Change Act 2008.

The strange elements of XR’s strategy – encouraging grief, gloom-picking, solutions denial, not even encouraging its own followers to take any personal action to cut emissions, disruption apparently ‘for its’ own sake’, it’s cult-like branding, promotion of ‘sacrifice’, attempting to bully NGOs into promoting it’s objectives, and its opaque organising techniques – all make sense when they are designed to combine and cause revolution rather than just eliminate climate-changing emissions.  If it continues, XR runs the risk of ending up like the ill-fated UK ‘Committee of 100’ (opposed to nuclear weapons in the 1960s), which one insider said became “a public spectacle, a group isolated from the general body of public opinion and feeling”.

It seems to me that XR has effectively been sheltered from much scrutiny under the ’emotional nuclear umbrella’ provided by Greta Thunberg. It has just issued a new strategy but it is very general and silent on the key questions of what has changed and been dropped, and what it’s new ‘theory of change’ is, if there is one.   XR needs to clarify this.

Perhaps understandably (because the media also did this) XR has claimed to be the author of elevated public concern over the environment in the current ‘green wave’ but in reality that trend began before XR and GT’s campaign began in 2018 and is mainly a reaction to real world events, as was the previous 1988-91 green wave (which actually reached higher levels of concern).  All parts of the climate movement, old and new, need to ensure that they extract a better legacy from the current wave of opportunity than NGOs and others did in the previous green wave.

Finally, we need two things that XR ad GT cannot directly provide.  First, if the ‘climate culture change’ and mass engagement brought by the new climate movement is to bear fruit, the science community needs to give us a clearer vision of what can be achieved, after climate emissions are ended and drawdown from the atmosphere and biosphere begins.  We need to get at least of a vision of what light there may be ‘at the end of the tunnel‘.  Second, beyond protest type activism and focused campaigns, in countries like the UK, we need a complementary movement to optimise the potential of ‘household’ level expenditures. These include ‘big ticket’ consumer choices such as what type of house to build or buy, or cars and other transport choices, or heating systems, as well as day to day choices such as diet.  This is a largely untapped and undirected resource.


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XR Meets Bryceson’s Political Checklist?

As Extinction Rebellion ponders its future and conducts a re-strategizing exercise, at least in the UK, it faces the prospect of perhaps having to gain the support of a broad based majority rather than a narrow segment engaged in sustained activism.

XR’s current theory hinges on overthrowing government in order to bring about wholesale change to resolve the climate emergency, on the assumption that a non-violent rebellion by 3.5% of a population is highly likely to succeed.  But that derives from Erica Chenoweth’s study of revolutions aimed at overthrow of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes actively oppressing a population.

In contrast ‘XR’ is most active in democracies used to a free press, politics and campaigns.  They might be grumbling and fed up and be worried about climate change but they don’t feel they’re actively oppressed and that revolution is their only way out.  So an increasing number of critics, external and internal, (eg here, here,here and here) have pointed out that the ‘magical’ 3.5% rule probably will not apply in democracies, even if XR could succeed in mobilising several million people rather than tens of thousands it has to date.

I’ve been looking at the very interesting strategies of XR(UK) and the associated activities of Greta Thunberg and the amazing school strikes and hope to post more on it shortly but if XR’s to continue and succeed in winning a broader social madate and, or, in working with the much wider army of NGOs, businesses and politicians also very active on climate change, it will need to start thinking more about practical politics.

Gail Bradbrook of RisingUp! and a leading founder of XR once said (video) “we don’t need to convert the Daily Mail readers thank goodness”.  True perhaps for a 3.5% vanguard but not true if you want to build a broad majority of support for a ‘rebellion’, or what you hope will follow (the conclusions of Citizens Assemblies on climate).  XR has also made almost a fetish of promoting a sense of doom, gloom and grieving, rejecting ‘positivity’ and denying that campaigns and government have had any useful effect – solutions denial.  This is not motivating to most people, and not politically attractive.  So a rethink might need to be quite radical.

That’s a long story but one small thing that might help is the ‘Political Checklist’ produced by public affairs exec Simon Bryceson.  I first shared this back in 2005 in Campaign Strategy Newsletter 13 but as it’s short, relevant and applies more widely (even though it refers to some UK political processes).  It shows things from a politician’s point of view. Here it is.

Bryceson’s Political Checklist



UNIQUENESS: The political process is crucially concerned with the new. If your proposal appears to be a way of doing more efficiently that which is already done, it will be an administrative rather than political issue. You may find sponsors, you won’t find champions.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS: The above not withstanding, politicians love to show that their radical idea works very effectively elsewhere.

COST: Is this proposal likely to be financially viable? A standard process of financial assessment, not to be confused with Treasury assessment. (See below).

TIMESCALE: Are the alleged advantages of this scheme likely to appear on a timescale relevant to other factors? A project that is likely to encounter electoral opposition but not come to fruition before the next election is unlikely to be thought ‘interesting’.

PERSONAL ADVANCEMENT: Will sponsoring this proposal benefit my personal reputation? Is it an issue I am historically, and positively associated with? Can I take ‘ownership’ of the issue and, if so, how bad might the downside be?

MEDIA FRIENDLY: Is this an issue that the popular press are going to like/take an interest in? No publicity is normally perceived in politics as no advantage.

ELECTORALLY ACUTE OR DIFFUSE:  “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, nor perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new” Niccolo Machiavelli. 1532.

Do those likely to lose under the new scheme know? Do those likely to gain care? A small group of electors who care a lot always outweigh a large group of electors who have other things to worry about.

WRONGFOOTING THE OPPOSITION: Politicians have an inordinate interest in their continued occupation of office or the rapid acquisition of it. This, of course, is entirely a matter of the public interest since the other lot are so awful one has a duty to prevent them holding office if at all possible. If your proposal embarrasses the opposition it will have interesting aspects.

TREASURY POLICY: In most modern countries there is Government policy and there is Treasury policy, the trick is to be in accord with both whilst noticing that they are rarely the same.

ELITE SUPPORT: Will a clever dick who knows something about the area catch me out? Have the proposers of this idea checked to see where informed opposition might come from and indicated how it might be minimised?

PARTY FUNDRAISING: Politics is a very expensive game; there is therefore a constant need to raise money. Can you show that your project has desirable implications for this process?

The Red Rebels on a visit to Wells Next the Sea on 24 December 2019 to “raise awareness about sea level rise”

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A Strategy To ‘Fly As Much As You Like’ ?

photo: Juhasz Imre, Creative Commons

Greta Thunberg and XR have re-energised the public fight against climate change and facilitated a new and additional protest movement.  The call to recognize a ‘climate emergency’ has resonated with many politicians, especially those ‘closer to the ground’  but for that energy to translate into faster, bigger, more profound change it needs to become instrumental, meaning that it needs to bear on dis-aggregated, less rhetorical, more granular targets.

Here’s a proposition for a campaign bearing on aviation – DAC-only flying – to effect rapid and significant change in response to the ‘climate emergency’.

In this project, governments should impose a legal obligation on commercial aviation to offset carbon emissions using DAC (Direct Air Capture of CO2) technology, either with certificated credits granted for carbon locked into rock such as basalt, or, by using liquid fuels created by drawing CO2 from the ambient air (or both together).  This would prevent commercial flying using fossil fuels free from offsets, or offsets which we cannot be certain will remain effective (eg tree planting).  Flying with commercial airlines would be DAC-only.

Within the same system, the aviation industry should be made to invest, to pay for DAC technologies, so incentivising airlines to scale up these technologies and reduce their cost.  The directed, focused development effort and attendant commercial risks would then be vertically integrated: airlines would in effect own their own fuel supply systems, although they would not need to become DAC technologists themselves.  By ramping the introduction and level of the requirement, the trend-breaking impact on aviation R&D and business models could be as severe or gentle as it needed to be. 

At present the aviation industry is nowhere near a path to sustainability.  This proposal would convert offsetting from a voluntary practice that mitgates the impact of individual decisions to travel by air, into an end-game mechanism bearing on corporates, to rapidly contain and shrink the carbon footprint of aviation.



Air travel has long been an effective no-go or slow-go area for policy-makers attempting to coax their colleagues, governments and voters into taking meaningful action to reduce climate-changing ‘carbon’ pollution.  Many governments – ours in the UK being only one good example – have long made top-line political commitments to significant de-carbonization while simultaneously planning to expand air travel as it was assumed to be essential for economic growth, and voter happiness.  Air travel is a famous example of a behaviour which shifted in the lifetimes of older people alive today, from an activity restricted to a tiny elite, to a larger ‘jet set’ elite, to become mainstream and problematically cheaper in cash terms than more sustainable alternatives such as the train.

For decades, even the most dogged campaigns to oppose airport expansion have struggled, especially on climate-grounds.  Back in 2006 I proposed that not-flying for the climate would become the ‘new save the whale’ as a socially testing issue, and it would become fashionable not to fly.  Well maybe it is, only 13 years later!  In reality, self-imposed restraint from flying has been confined to the most committed individuals and organizations, not even adopted as a norm by the majority of ‘ethical’ NGOs, and until recently, widely ignored as an option even among academics, and with breath-taking incongruence, even by many climate scientists.

An at least-vague-awareness of the climate impact of flying is however very widespread.  The  discomfort very many people feel when deciding to fly, is resolved by drawing on a wide spectrum of motivated reasoning, such as citing compensatory behaviours in the personal climate-guilt register such as “I do a lot to recycle”, “I’m now vegetarian”, “I buy renewable electricity”,  to specific balancing investments such as “we bought an offset” or even higher ethical purpose [ethical excusers or Ethcusers] “as a campaigner for [ A  ] I will make a greater difference for humanity by taking this flight than spending X time going by [sea/ rail/ bus/ camel/ bike]”.

This has attracted quite a bit of campaigner or advocate attention, aimed at finding ways to get people to voluntarily give up flying.  That is necessary and important but as a political catalyst not in itself a reliable and rapid delivery route to end the aviation problem.  To achieve that we must confine and bind the dynamic driving aviation expansion and drive out the emissions.  The problem is cheap fossil fueled flights unconstrained (indeed encouraged) by public policy.


Proxies and Decoys


The air industry has of course titrated its PR efforts and investments in alternative fuels and technologies to try and maintain the equilibrium and hold the spectre of trend-breaking regulatory action at bay for as long as possible.  Like other sectors before it, the industry has tried to maintain a focus on comparative metrics of efficiency, per passenger emissions etc, which allow it to continue business growth as usual, and draw attention away from ballooning emissions.  Like the tobacco industry it has promoted ‘choice’ framing and offered the somewhat-less damaging options while signing up to vague commitments to be responsible.   These proxies and decoys have enabled it to continue growing and polluting while industries such as power generation have been slowly ensnared in carbon reduction.


Now, with climate change indisuptably happening all around us, and Greta Thunberg and XR raising the level of social activity,  flying is being more seriously questioned.   Numerous reports attribute Thunberg’s influence to a rapid increase in demand for voluntary offsetting and governments are creeping towards more taxes.  Yet experience with many other sectors, such as the spread of organic food, ‘green investment’, and sustainability certification for fish and forests, is that elective action can build a vanguard, prove concepts and, if values dynamics are engaged, transition behaviours from innovative to mainstream to ‘normal’ but it can take a long time.  If regulators stand back, it will also leave an unengaged ‘tail’ of unsustainable practice which can be very large (eg the great majority) while generating ‘best practice’ examples that can be gamed by politicains who want to avoid taking regulatory action.


Contain and Shrink


I suggest that we need to convert offsetting from a voluntary practice that mitigates the impact of individual decisions to travel by air, into an end-game mechanism to rapidly contain and shrink the carbon footprint of aviation.

This is a vast subject but a handy reality-check on the sustainability trajectory of the aviation industry was provided by Evan Davis’s BBC programme The Bottom Line on the future of commercial aviation, broadcast in July 2019 [see excerpts below, at the end].  Talking to three experienced industry insiders, Davis  gradually drew out confirmation that the industry is not on any credible trajectory to coming good on even its own climate commitments.  I thought two telling points were the low volume of air travel that is for business, and the impact of the Swedish fylgskam or flight-shaming movement, which has ‘stagnated’ air travel growth in Sweden in around 18 months.  As on so many previous environmental, Sweden along with California, still often acts as a pathfinder.


Davis mentioned that only 26% of travel at Heathrow Airport is for business.  The vast bulk is recreational.  Viewed with one assumption this makes the present air-travel business look politically unassailable but if you see it otherwise, as a social behaviour on the move like the real and rapid shift to eating less meat in the UK,  it could indicate political vulnerability.  In addition, while policy wonks think about tech and statistical sectors, the public encounters this through airline brands that, like banks, are often resented.


However, unlike eating every day or doing food shopping every week, the personal social touchpoints of flying are, for most of us, few.  Most people in most countries don’t fly very often (Swedes fly a lot).  This makes campaigns which rely on social contagion rather harder to sustain.   On the other hand it also means that ‘doing the right thing’ can be relatively low cost in terms of personal investment, especially if some flying remains a possibility.


Re-Purposing Offset Technologies


It’s true that until recently, many long-term climate campaigners (me included) have resisted devoting much attention to carbon-capture proposals and the wide range of speculative ideas for planetary geo-engineering, and I think, for good reasons.   For example because many proposals were for devices attached to continued or new use of fossil fuels in electricity production (eg Carbon Capture and Storage).  In other cases they included vast and uncontrollable manipulation of ecosystems, such as ocean fertilisation.  And in nearly all cases they could divert public concern and attention, and thus political attention and action, away from regulation and investment change required to decarbonize economies in proven ways such as switching to renewable energy, raising efficiency and cutting waste.


Actual climate change is now happening as anticipated by models and other science but far faster than was widely expected.  What we feared to see in the second half of this century is already happening today.   Movements like XR and Rapid Transition are partly inspired by this realisation but to exert change-making pressure they need dis-aggregated targets, instrumental campaigns rather than just protest, and propositions more granular than ‘nobody is doing anything’, ‘the system needs to change’ and ‘we need deep adaptation’.  Aviation offers one such opportunity.


Air travel contributes a small part of the overall pollution causing climate change but it is growing rapidly and hugely important both politically and psychologically.  It’s been largely untouched by the mainstreaming of ‘mitigation’ carbon-reduction measures that have been transforming electricity generation and biting into vehicle emissions (electric cars etc) and other sectors.  Not only that but it’s been aspirational, emblematic of the ‘innocent’ pre-sustainability world in which air travel was associated with freedom and enjoyment, holidays and tourism, and business success, built on untramelled climate pollution.


Over-Ripe For Disruption


The aviation model is over-ripe for disruption, and in many ways could be far easier to deal with than other sectors such as land-use and farming or domestic energy use and terrestrial transport, for a number of reasons.


  • Decisions about aircraft design and manufacture are mainly taken by just two giant companies, Airbus and Boeing (although as with other sectors, radical disruptive innovation may well come from new market entrants)
  • At present the architecture of consumer choice is constrained: if we fly we have to buy the service from an airline. Almost none of us own our own aircraft (and regulators should act before many do).
  • Jet fuel is already heavily regulated and monitored and therefore totally responsive to action through existing regulatory machinery
  • Airlines are constrained by slots at a small number of airports, similar to rail services arriving and departing from railway termini. This also means that nation states or supra-national bodies like the EU potentially have leverage over the fleet mix – certain types of plane and fuels could be excluded or treated differently, as cities have done with ground transport.
  • Because of this the problem is simple: essentially, more is progressively worse, less is progressively better, and it is the same everywhere: at present the world has one dominant model for air travel, one source and type of emissions, one set of technologies and few players. It is not a very ‘wicked’ problem.


So there are few decision makers, and a handful of regulators and companies make critical decisions, not the millions of airline users (international shipping is similar in that the vast number of cargo shippers and product end users all buy essentially the same service, and it has also remained comparatively untouched by climate policy).  Thanks to technological domination and globalisation it is a far simpler problem than say, emissions from agriculture and other land uses which are hideously diverse and complex at multiple levels.


This makes aviation a straightforward way to deliver significant radical change, if one can convince regulators that it is urgent, and technically, economically and politically feasible.


Manifestation of public concern and attributable events are providing evidence of urgency.  Meanwhile the track record and plans of the aviation industry show that its incremental iterative approach to change is more a PR shield than a radical change programme, and will not do the job.  As Evan Davis concluded, “there is no plan” in the aviation industry which can reach sustainability.


Aside from the adoption issue (getting consumers to use it), a much-discussed problem with offsets is the lack of certainty in the fate of compensating carbon ostensibly captured and sequestered (stored) by NETs (Negative Emission Technologies).  Even if one can guarantee that initial funding has the intended effect such as installing more renewables, that only cancels out the flight emissions if it displaces carbon electricity generation, which in turn requires a bounded regulatory system and an enforced carbon-elimination policy.  Not many countries have that.  Even less certain is what happens to offsetting such as tree planting or forest conservation (essential though I agree those are).  It relies on having a guarantee that the initially captured carbon will remain in the soils or timber, and not be released, for instance, through burning or land clearance.




Of the many NETs under discussion, in development and in use, two seem to me to offer a potential route to divert the aviation industry from its current comfortable flightpath, which for the planet and humanity is disastrous.   Both involve DAC or Direct Air Capture of CO2, also known as DACC, Direct Air Carbon Capture.  A few years ago these were in the realm of ‘science fiction’ but no longer.


There are several main DAC technologies with different ways of locking carbon back into rocks, effectively mimicking the result of natural carbon storage as limestone and chalk were laid down with calcium carbonate derived from the bodies of small sea creatures, and coal, oil and gas were created from ancient plant material.   In theory at least, such geological fixing of carbon should be more dependable than for instance, injecting CO2 into solution in old oil reservoirs.  Geological fixing removes carbon from the biosphere and atmosphere whereas DAC used for instance to create a stream of CO2 gas taken from the exhaust of a gas fired power station will quickly release it again if that is used to make fizzy drinks.



The world’s first commercial DACC system is the Swiss-based Climeworks which describes itself as ‘a technology to reverse climate change’.    Climeworks say  (video) their vision is to capture 1% of global CO2 emissions in 2025, requiring 750,000 shipping containers of equipment, equivalent to the number passing through Shanghai in a fortnight.  Double that and you have emissions from commercial aviation. In Iceland (video) Climeworks is working with other companies in a demonstration Carbfix project which reacts and fixes captured CO2 in basalt rock (a very widespread family of igneous rocks formed in areas of volcanic activity).


A well known objection to anything relying on DAC is cost.  As Fuss et al note ‘Most of the discussion around DACCS potential has been dominated by cost considerations as the key parameter determining the viability of the technology’.   Much effort is going into reducing cost so that carbon captured this way comes within the ballpark of existing carbon reduction options.    Cheaper will indeed be better but rather than relying on limited government grant aid and venture capital raised by start-ups,  this proposal is to make the aviation industry reliant on DACs, and for them to be locked into funding it, so long as conventional fuel is used.


Another application of DAC is to take CO2 from the air and recycle it into jet fuel.  In 2018 National Geographic reported ‘Carbon Engineering, a Canadian company, is already making a liquid fuel by sucking carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the atmosphere and combining it with hydrogen from water. This is an engineering breakthrough on two fronts: A potentially cost-effective way to take CO2 out of the atmosphere to fight climate change and a potentially cost-competitive way to make gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel that doesn’t add any additional CO2 to the atmosphere’.  It added ‘they hope the economics will be in their favor’.  A similar process was backed by Bill Gates in the US in 2018, and in 2019 Climeworks announced that with others (EDL Anlagenbau Gesellschaft GmbH), it is to produce carbon-from-air jet fuel with Rotterdam The Hague Airport in the Netherlands.

Both these systems could be made manadatory within a DAC-only flying regime.


In short, under the system proposed above, aviation as a sector and flying as a consumer choice would become by ‘guaranteed’ DAC-offset-only.  DAC-flying would be the only commercial option.  This would:


  • End reliance on individual consumer or individual corporate initaitives to buy offsets in order to mitigate and eliminate the impact of aviation on climate
  • End regulator blind-eye tolerance of the aviation industry’s “hot air” PR based on illusory promises about iterative efficiency gains from a business as usual system
  • Create a high-certainty stream of finance for mass development and deployment of DAC technologies with a powerful fast-track incentive, in a similar model to wartime technology-forcing policies
  • Provide a simple policy option in international government discussions to ‘resolve’ and take emergency action on a key part of the climate crisis which until now has been very much ignored
  • Give the aviation industry a bridging option as new technologies such as electric power are developed
  • Be consistent with established regulatory models already shown to be effective in other sectors, such as Non Fossil Fuel Obligation schemes
  • Enable governments to focus near-term climate-crisis public expenditure on more complicated and wicked problems such as those related to land-use, by chopping of a bit of the problem where the polluter can be made to pay


Of course this is not a fix to all the other problems associated with air travel.   It is also highly likely that any significant near-term ramping up of the requirement to use DAC would mean that air travel would become more expensive but it would not become impossible, and those who travel by air most are both the richest and would pay most.


* Elements of this have been discussed in many blogs, learned reports and articles on aviation offsetting and NET technologies eg Royal Society 2009,  Lomax et al 2015,  Choice 2017, Sabine Fuss et al 2018, Wired 2018, Aviation Environment Federation 2019,  I’m not aware of this particular proposal being made before but do let me know if it has been.




BBC ‘The Bottom Line’ programme Radio 4, 27 July 2019, presented by Evan Davis: ‘The Future of Commercial Aviation – segment on emissions (second part of programme).  Below is my rough transcript of excerpts.


Interviewees: (three trade insiders) Paul Kahn, president, Connectivity, Cobham Plc; Volodymyr Bilotkach, economist, author of The Economics of Airlines; Rob Morris, head of Global Consultancy, Ascend by Cirium.  Interviewer: Evan Davis


* * *


Those of you in the UK can listen to the programme here.  Those outside the UK may struggle if you do not have a VPN.  So here are my approximate transcript extracts (I found it hard to distinguish Paul Kahn and Rob Morris so I’ve notated them as C for contributor and V for Volodymyr and ED for Evan Davis – sadly there is no BBC transcript at the website)


* * *


C: growth is 5% per annum … there are about 25,000 passenger aircraft in service … it’s cost driven [by cheapness] we fly more for business and leisure


V: growth is about 10% per annum in Asia


ED: if we do nothing we expect it to continue to grow


C: expect 5% compound … 20% savings on emissions from new plane designs … 15% for a specific model, completely new aircraft


ED: is efficiency gain keeping up with passenger growth ?


C: it will take until 2026 before the new-engined [more efficient] fleet is bigger than than the existing fleet of aircraft


V: load factor has increased from 75% to 85% in 20 years, [airlines like] RyanAir achieve 95%, the fleet is growing overall 3.5% and [business] 5% due to productivity


[airlines and manufacturers are] reducing size, weight, power [per passenger per aircraft]


ED: Growth is exceeding capability of the industry to reduce its emissions – what are you guys going to do ? I mean come on – 2050 we are meant to be on net zero carbon. What is the aviation industry expecting to deliver by 2050?


C: IATA … ten years ago pledged to grow neutrally with respect to carbon by 2020. Its 2019 … haven’t been able to


V: [it was/meant to be] a 50% cut by 2050


ED: assume Paris Compatible by 2050 – how ?


C: must see some sort of break with technology – most significantly hybrid electric


ED: how?


C: transform design of the plane [no longer need engines under wings etc] – debate [will be] hybrid versus electric … batteries too heavy for long distance [or heavy load]


ED: so why is half a battery better?


C: for an air taxi it’s ok [but not larger longer flight aircraft]


V: once cars became more efficient people drove more – the rebound effect [I wonder if the same is happening in air travel] – airlines may think it’s [a] more efficient [aircraft] I can fly it more – what effect on emissions ?


C: some are growing at 6% – price stimulation of demand … [we] get to shaming of flying – whether [it’s right to] just have three or four long weekends in Eastern Europe from London, just because you can ?


ED: what you are saying is that you don’t have an answer.  Hybrid plane – how far away ?


C: long haul ? 10 years at least


ED: [this is] not even remotely close


C: Airbus is flying a four engined jet [in Europe with one electric engine] hybrid [test] just starting


ED: so 2035 for big hybrid planes?


C: right order of magnitude … 14 new types of aircraft in next … years … more iterative than disruptive … [it’s a] challenge the industry is investing in


ED: this is the hot air we’re used to from the aviation industry [paraphrasing] “we’re taking this very seriosuly, we’re signing up to these targets, [and] by the way we missed it the last time we did it … but we are ever more ambitious in the targets were going to sign up to …” – there’s no plan


C: I agree but you still want to fly and so do I … [there is a] clear alignment between environmental impact and the operating costs for an airiline …


ED: Except, except, except I would rather be a big airline growing with more passengers …do we think that for the climate-conscious flyer, does it become a little more taboo ?


C: [it’s] beginning to happen – in Sweden growth in the industry has slowed or in fact stagnated very recently – so it will happen but the cat’s out of the bag and we travel for leisure and we travel for businesss …


ED: Well I just want to say, we don’t travel that much for business, I was shocked researching this to find that Heathrow is 26% of flights are for business – most are holiday or visiting friends or relatives


V: because the price is right so people fly, if you want people to stop flying just introduce a tax on them


ED: so … we are going to make a choice – you’re going to do your best to keep emissions per passenger very low, it’s not going to be enough with unconstrained growth and isn’t constrained  non-growth the only way that the world will reconcile it’s stated targets on emissions and the aviation industry ?


C: technological progress can make a massive difference


ED: you haven’t managed to convince me you have any route to achieving sustainability [although note that] only 2% of emissions [CO2] are from aviation


C: fuel is 25% of airline’s overall costs and it’s now $US/gallon, when in 2011/12 it was $US3/gallon still aviation grew … made efficiencies


V: [the] CORSIA cap and trade offsetting ICAO initiative, interntional flights only, [in] 2030 pretty much manadatory except very poorest countries – it’s a start [see CORSIA wikipedia]


ED: what about carbon capture – does that remotely work as an option? Planting forests … ?


C: as V explained carbon pricing [has to be] applied to aviation, it’s all about introducing those sort of complex models to incentivise the right behaviour [and] the right investment choices for a more sustainable future.




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Killing the Wind of England

How The Values-Politics of Eurosceptic, Climatesceptic Conservatives Halted Wind Energy in England

Chris Rose

long post – download as a pdf

[This post follows up the previous blog ‘Brexit Values Story 2.2’ or the campaign ‘lessons of Brexit’ in values terms.  For sources related to the below text see links in Full Wind Politics Timeline.  See also Condensed Timeline, slides, and Political Actors].

Delabole – Britain’s first commercial wind farm (started up, 1991), Cornwall. Pic: Good Energy

This is a case study in how a ‘counter-revolution’ in values-politics set back progress in tackling a major social threat, namely climate change.

It is true that resistance from oil, coal and gas interests, business as usual momentum and feeble political commitment has been effective in stifling ‘climate progress’ on many fronts in the UK: for example continued development of oil and gas, new airport capacity and ‘offshoring’ of carbon emissions embedded in imported goods.  But this case is unusual.  It was a notable victory for climate sceptics in which an effective pro-climate policy was stopped, rolled back and effectively killed off.

It’s the story of how Britain or more specifically England, came to set aside its abundant resources of wind energy as a result of organized campaigning by right-wing Eurosceptic and Climatesceptic Conservative politicians.  They used the threat of values-based competition between UKIP and the Tories to drive the Conservatives towards the authoritarian Settler right.

Many of the same network, certainly inspired and perhaps helped by US neocon organisations, then orchestrated the same values dog-whistles to drive the vote for Brexit in 2016.

This campaign drove David Cameron and the ‘social liberalisers’ to abandon their attempt to modernize the UK Conservative Party, turning it from pro- to anti-wind.

It’s left Britain with a UKIP-style energy policy: an effective ban on its cheapest form of new renewable energy but subsidising fracking for gas.  As a result the UK now faces significant problems in the struggle to decarbonize its economy.  It was a significant success for climate sceptics who want to keep fossil fuel industry alive, and it happened largely below the radar of public concern.

The banishment of new wind power from England came about not through any change in public opinion – it has remained overwhelmingly positive from the 2000s to date – but through a failure of environmental NGOs and the renewables industry to turn expressive support for wind into instrumental political support at a local level.  In contrast, anti-wind campaigners succeeded in manipulating party politics to drive the Conservatives away from the political ‘centre’, and back towards fossil fuels.   It was a struggle between the past and the future, in which the past won.

The Roots of the Political Backlash Against Wind

It could be said that former Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher instigated both sides of the fight.

On 20 September 1988 her Bruges speech warned against development of a “European Super-state”, and inspired a new generation of UK Eurosceptic Conservatives.

Just seven days later she delivered her equally famous ‘climate speech’ to the Royal Society in London, in which she warned humanity had “unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of this planet itself …. “a global heat trap”.

Margaret Thatcher calls for urgent action on climate change at the UN, 1989.   We need “new technologies to clean up the environment” and “non-fossil fuel sources” of energy.

Thatcher’s enthusiasm for climate action lasted a few years.  She redoubled her urging for international climate action in 1989, and launched the Hadley Centre into climate research before being deposed by her cabinet in a row over Europe in 1990.  By then Britain had its first ‘non fossil fuel obligation’ to fund alternative energy and in 1991, its first onshore wind farm.  After that, and in line with scientific findings and international agreements including EU policy, successive British governments gradually ramped up their ambitions for renewables, including onshore wind which was cheaper and easier to deploy than offshore wind.

Meanwhile a cohort of mainly young Eurosceptic British Conservatives joined the European Parliament in 1999, and many set about harrying the European institutions, seeking evidence of corruption and generally criticizing and obstructing process as much as possible.  They included Martin Callanan, and Daniel Hannan, Chris Heaton-Harris, and an older man, Roger Helmer who together termed themselves the ‘H-Block’.

Roger Helmer, Daniel Hannan and Chris Heaton Harris, members of the MEP ‘H Block’ in the European Parliament

Helmer and Heaton-Harris shared an office in the East Midlands where they employed Sally McNamara as a press officer.  She moved with them to Brussels and went on to the US to work for the right-wing lobby group ALEC, whose conferences were subsequently attended by all four MEPs.  McNamara became ALEC’s International Relations Project Director building up networks of contact between ALEC and right-wing British and European politicians, as well as being a columnist for The Bruges Group, named after Thatcher’s seminal ‘Bruges Speech’.

Sally McNamara (from Roger Helmers’ blog)

Quote from Roger Helmer’s blog in 2011   Bill Newton Dunn subsequently left the Conservatives over their drift to Euroscepticism and joined the Liberal Democrats. His son is Tom Newton Dunn, political editor of The Sun.  McNamara went on to work for US defence contractor Raytheon (see also ‘Political Actors’)

Hannan had been the first director of the European Research Group in 1993, and went on to become a founder of Vote Leave, the official Leave campaign in the 2016 Referendum.  Heaton-Harris later said that he was a “a bit of a greenie” when he first joined the European Parliament but became a climate sceptic after meeting Bjorn Lomborg in 2001.  Helmer also credits Lomborg for his antipathy to action on climate change, and used his position in the European Parliament to host meetings of well-known professional sceptics, and even fund anti-wind energy posters in the UK.

Back in Britain all that many people knew about ‘Europe’ was the continuing civil war inside the Conservative Party which had dogged Prime Minister John Major before his defeat by pro-European Tony Blair in 1997.  That and stories about rules on bent bananas created by Daily Telegraph writer Boris Johnson.

In real life, Britain was also changing.   From the 1980s to the 2000s the balance of values in UK society had inverted.  Settlers went from being the mainstream to the smallest values group, and the Pioneers took their place.  ‘Tribal’ political alleigances were diminishing because such identity politics is an inherently Settler feature [1].  Consequently, the Pioneers and Prospectors were increasingly important in determining elections.  CDSM values surveys showed that Blair appealed to many Prospectors as well as Pioneers and with the help of his deputy John Prescott, Blair’s New Labour hung onto enough of the traditional Settler vote to win two more General Elections in 2001 and 2005.

No More Nasty Party?

Reliance on a traditional authoritarian Conservative pitch appealed to the Settler base but that was shrinking and it was not enough for Michael Howard to win the 2005 General Election.  So a Conservative leadership contest began, and young David Cameron entered it with a modernizing agenda, wanting the ‘detoxify’ the Conservative Party and attract more younger and female voters (Prospectors and Pioneers) on the Blair model.  Cameron’s ideas were supported by Theresa May who in 2003 said that people saw the Conservatives as the “nasty party” and that, had to change.

But in Brussels the newer Eurosceptic MEPs seem to have found a political ‘madrassa’ and agitated against the old guard of pro-European Conservatives, wanting a break with the mainstream European Parliament conservative bloc the EPP.

They rallied around rightwing candidates for the leadership, such as Liam Fox.  So to attract the support of the Eurosceptic wing of the party, Cameron promised that if leader, he would break with the EPP and form a new group of conservativse in the European Parliament.  It proved a fateful decision, putting Cameron on a slippery slope of trying to appease the right and being pulled rigthwards.  As the Europhile centrist Tory Kenneth Clarke said later, “If you want to go feeding crocodiles then you’d better not run out of buns” as if you do, they come for you.

The BBC reports Cameron’s leadership campaign success

Elected Leader in December 2005, Cameron symbolically changed the Conservative ‘torch of freedom’ logo to a green tree.  He actively courted socially liberal Pioneer causes such as overseas aid, and groups like Oxfam but in 2006 he also made good on his commitment to the Eurosceptics and pulled his MEPs out of the EPP. This created a new more right-wing bloc, the ECR.  Ultimately this break with the EPP would isolate Cameron from mainstream conservative leaders in the EU, undermining his attempts to win a referendum on European membership by first securing a ‘better deal’.

At home Cameron ran the local election Conservative campaign with the slogan “vote blue, go green”.  To demonstrate his commitment to acting on climate change in 2006 he visited the Arctic with WWF and ‘hugged a husky’. He also pledged support to the Friends of the Earth campaign for a Climate Change Bill.  By this time Cameron was pulled in two directions: one ‘progressive’ and ‘reflexive’,  reinventing the Conservatives to attract Prospectors and Pioneers, the other, ‘anti-reflexive’, a rearguard action, retrenching to please ageing, increasingly right-wing party membership. The Eurosceptic outriders of the ERG hated the greenery and new softer more liberal Conservative agenda.  In 2007 Cameron had a wind turbine fixed to the roof of his London house but he was under increasing pressure from the Eurosceptic right and the green tree logo went blue by August.

Cameron’s roof gets a turbine (PA)

At the 2010 General Election Cameron declared that if elected, the Conservatives would form the “greenest government ever”, although by now the tree logo had morphed into Union Jack colours.

Tory Party logos 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010 onwards

Cell-Mates Rather Than Soul-Mates

The Conservatives won the most seats of any party but failed to get a majority and went into coalition with the Liberal Democrats led by Nick Clegg.  The LibDems were committed supporters of more renewable energy but their long-standing values base was a small tight section of the map, lying almost entirely in the Pioneers.  As the survey below shows, it was the mirror image of the Conservative values base at the time.  In government the two parties were more cell-mates than soul-mates.  The coalition was an alliance of convenience rather than conviction.  Although after the inconclusive result of the General Election, many saw co-operating to form some sort of government as in the broader national interest, the partnership threatened the political integrity of both partners.  There was some ideological overlap between libertarian free-traders of both parties but they were atypical members.    With almost no values overlap (values = deep seated attitudes and beliefs), it was an inherently unstable partnership which didn’t feel right to most of the natural supporters of either party.

Values maps of the political parties in 2012/3.  There is almost no overlap between Conservative and LibDem, making the coalition feel un-natural to most supporters, and inherently fragile.  But there is total overlap between UKIP and the Conservatives, making the Tories vulnerable to defections.

However, the Conservatives were electorally threatened in a very direct way by the rise of UKIP, whose values base (right arrow) was entirely inside the Conservative one, and very Settler.  UKIP’s share of the vote at General Elections had increased from under 1% in the 1990s to 3% in 2010, and its share of the vote at European Parliament Elections rose to 17% in 2009.

So Cameron was in a values bind.  He had embraced a modernizing project to take the Conservatives into power by attracting Pioneer voters but ended up as the leader of a coalition with the Liberal Democrats.  They were almost entirely Pioneers but their members mainly disliked the Conservatives, and the LibDems were in turn seen as ‘holier than thou’ and ‘do-gooders’ by many in the Settler and Golden Dreamer (Prospector) wing of his own party, who were ‘instinctively’ climate sceptic and preferred UKIPs ideas to those of the LibDems.

Climate scepticism came easily to the socially-conservative Settler motivational values group as it is pre-disposed to avoid change and signs of change, whether to the landscape or to culture (eg immigration).  As a result, across the world, Settlers are at the epicentre of climate scepticism where it exists, and invariably the last to support new behaviours, ideas or technologies.   As it happens, although they are only 25% of the population (and 30% of the electorate), the UK has a larger proportion of Settlers than almost any other country.

The overlapping values base of UKIP and the Conservatives meant both were competing for the support of the most instinctively climate sceptic people in the UK (below).   Which meant the seemingly esoteric issue of wind technology could be a live electoral issue in Tory-UKIP competition.

This climate scepticism also coincided with anti-immigration sentiment – agreement with “there are too many foreigners in my country” – and, as seen earlier (Brexit Values Story parts 1, 2.1 and 2.2), disapproval of the EU.  So although UKIP’s three main policy planks – anti-EU, anti-immigration and anti-wind – were often seen as limited and eccentric by more mainstream politicians in the early 2000s (Cameron called UKIP ‘fruitcakes’), they made perfect sense as a values platform with which to peel away support from the Conservatives.

In January 2006 David Hanley of the University of Cardiff wrote in Politico that ‘Tories of all shades remain very frightened of UKIP, especially younger candidates who have confronted it and had to explain why Tory policy on Europe is less red-blooded’.

Luff’s Bill

In 2009 Conservative MP Peter Luff proposed a wind farm (habitation) bill, to keep larger wind turbines 1.5 miles away from houses.  Luff said he was not a climate sceptic but pointed out (rightly) that rules for compensating local householders and planning restrictions were both more robust in other countries than in England and  Wales.  He had been contacted by “extraordinary” numbers of people from around England, concerned about large wind turbines that were going to be put up near their homes.

Luff’s bill was introduced under the ’10 Minute Rule’ and got nowhere but it created a template for policy opposition, and help was on the way.

Chris Heaton-Harris began campaigning against wind farms as early as 2008, at Brixworth in Northants, while he was still a MEP rather than a MP.

From the Brixworth Bulletin in 2008  The author seems sceptical that the meeting had in fact been organised by local parish councils

When elected in 2010, Heaton Harris used his maiden speech to attack the “folly” of wind farms and reintroduced Luff’s Bill as a ‘proximity’ Bill.  That too failed but when in 2010 the government tried to rationalise planning rules in a NPPF or National Planning Policy Framework, anti-wind campaigns were gifted a way to make their cause part of a national issue and to align with established groups such as the CPRE (Council for the Protection of Rural England).

By 2011 a raft of larger countryside groups were opposing the NPPF and the Daily Telegraph had started a ‘Hands off Our Land’ campaign.    Heaton-Harris pointed out that the NPPF contained a ‘presumption for sustainable development’, which he said meant a presumption in favour of wind farms.

Heaton Harris’s book on Kelmarsh and a UKIP guide to fighting wind farms, both published in 2012

In early 2012, prompted by an Inspectors decision in favour of the Kelmarsh wind farm despite opposition of local councils, Heaton-Harris, who was Chair of the ERG from 2010 to 2016, invited all Conservative MPs to a meeting.  On January 30, 101 of them and a few other MPs signed a letter to David Cameron.  It demanded a ‘dramatic’ cut in funding for onshore wind, and a rewriting of the planning rules so that ‘local communities’ could easily stop wind farms.

A meeting with Cameron and his energy and planning Ministers soon followed, and the Conservative pro-wind policy started to be dismantled.  It began the slow death of Cameron’s seven year experiment in greening the Tory Party and his attempt to steer the Conservatives into Prospector-Pioneer territory.  In 2015 the Conservative manifesto would announce that ‘we will halt the spread of onshore wind farms’.

By March 2012 it was reported that local opposition to windfarms had tripled since 2010 following political and media attacks focused on landscape impacts and subsidy, even though most people still supported having wind farms nearby.

By April 2012 Chris Heaton Harris was announcing “the beginning of the end” of onshore wind, and in June Lincolnshire County Council adopted a policy of not approving wind farms within 10km of any village, effectively excluding new wind from the county.  In October that year Heaton Harris launched a lobbying company ‘Together Against Wind’ to coordinate and raise funds for a national network of local campaigns to pressure Ministers.

The Together Against Wind campaign run (2012 – 17) by Chris Heaton Harris and later his protégé Thomas Pursglove MP – from the internet archive.   It was most active in 2012.  See also Political Actors doc.

Acute versus Diffuse

While public opinion remained overwhelmingly pro-wind, strong opposition to wind was concentrated in a small segment of older right-wing voters likely to vote for UKIP or the Tories.  Yet only a handful of activists were needed to manifest local ‘community’ opposition, and to populate a photo for the local press or a Facebook post.

Roger Helmer MEP and Chris Heaton-Harris MP in 2013 meeting with REVOLT campaigners in Lincolnshire

It is possible that the anti-wind campaign recruited some supporters from the ‘Countryside Marches’ co-ordinated by the pro-hunting group Countryside Alliance in the 2000s.   In a Values and Voters Study (2005) I wrote

‘The Countryside Alliance and its campaign for ‘rural values’ and foxhunting, pitted a Settler-dominated group against a largely disinterested and mostly esteem-driven ‘urban majority’. (Although in London, over 40% of the population is made up of inner-directed Pioneers). At first their numbers panicked Ministers but it soon became apparent that demographics were against them: they represented a highly mobilised but tiny group of people, and for all their huffing and puffing, were natural followers rather than activists. In a war they would have been natural soldiers but in a political campaign their traditional conservatism and inability to make common cause with other groups in society, worked against them.’

The Alliance held ‘marches on London’ which reached 300,000 (2002) but as these went on it showed their real base was limited.  The anti-wind campaign did not make this mistake: it organized a top down co-ordination of protest populated with ‘community’ actors.  It focused on organising and pressuring MPs locally, where its numbers seemed big enough, and on letter writing to Ministers who were in any case already being briefed to respond to their demands.  It then aligned with other established organizations on a case by case basis.

Since 2011 Heaton-Harris had been publishing a guide ‘Fighting Wind Farms’ and offering to help local campaigners around the country.  The anti-wind movement set about organizing constituency by constituency support to local groups, while the mainstream environmental movement mainly remained focused on national and international climate policy.  The anti-wind campaign had the upper hand as it mobilized a small number of very motivated people who could exert acute pressure on a very sensitive target (Conservative electoral fears), whereas the pro-wind lobby was vast but its effect was very diffuse.

Like Major before him, Cameron was now dogged by Eurosceptic insurrections.  In October 2011 he suffered the biggest ‘biggest ever’ rebellion by Tory MPs over whether there would be a referendum on Europe and only avoided defeat through support from the Opposition.  LSE political Blogger Pete Radford wrote that Cameron had ‘little room to manoeuvre’ and the right were ‘picking apart his liberal conservative project’. Of the 81 Conservative rebels, ‘a massive 49 were new MPs, elected in 2010’ and, noted Radford: ‘the party is no longer split between sceptics and non-sceptics but … hard sceptics and soft sceptics’.  Since May 2010, there had already been ‘22 Conservative rebellions over Europe’.

A Systematic Shut Down

Over the three years following the 2012 Heaton-Harris letter, Cameron’s Ministers conducted a systematic shut-down of the onshore wind industry, which continued from 2016 under Theresa May.

First the industry was demonized and existing funding was wound back. Then planning rules were turned upside down to create a presumption against onshore wind, making wind farms almost impossible to build.

To achieve these ends, the Conservatives overcame opposition from their junior coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats.  Anti-wind politicians were installed to deliver the change, such as Conservative Energy Minister John Hayes who Cameron asked to “deliver a win for our people” on wind farms.

Eric Pickles – as planning Minister, called in and cancelled many wind farms

Local Government Minister Eric Pickles was deployed to put the brakes on wind projects already in ‘the pipeline’.  In 2013 he revised planning rules to give more weight to local concerns about landscape and ‘heritage’, and by March 2014 had intervened to take 35 wind farm planning appeals away from inspectors.  He took extra powers to intervene and extended them until the 2015 election, and by November 2014 he had halted 50 wind farms. This, it was said, at the cost of £500m and 2000 rural jobs.  At least one wind farm was stopped despite having local Council support.

2014 – Pickles kills off Killington wind farm despite community and Council support

A new financial ‘framework’ was introduced, ostensibly to protect consumers from higher energy bills but in practice it was used to cut funds for renewables while subsidies for oil and fracking were increased.

Finally, when the rapidly falling cost of new onshore wind and largescale solar-pv meant they became by far the most cost-effective way to generate electricity, and so would have beaten bids using coal, oil, gas or nuclear in the Contracts for a Difference auctions, large onshore wind and solar  were excluded from the government-controlled energy marketplace when the government simply did not hold the relevant auctions.

While this process wasn’t exactly secret (see the large number of media reports cited in the Timelines), it was stealthy and obscure, involving gradual adjustment to  technical orders way below the radar of popular attention.   The mainstream media mainly covered the issue through individual site conflicts with a particular angle of interest (eg at Naseby Battlefield in Northants or at Big Field in Cornwall where it divided the Church of England and its sustainability policy from some parishioners).    Changes to energy policy often explained through personality conflicts within the coalition government (2010-15), such as when pro-renewables Ministers like Ed Davey or Greg Barker were replaced or stood down.  In the classic manner of a government u-turn, the throttling, starving and eventual exclusion of onshore wind avoided any dramatic moment of decision that might create an opportunity to critics.

A 2014 story from The Guardian about a long running battle to win approval for Good Energy’s ‘Big Field’ wind farm in Cornwall which divided a community (and split the church), and led some people to say they would switch from voting Conservative or LibDem to UKIP (it was ultimately rejected).

The natural proponents of wind were the renewables industry and the green NGOs but the task of organizing a meaningful defence seemed to fall between them. The wind industry itself relied on a legalistic approach and proved generally inept at mobilizing public support, in some cases becoming its own worst enemy.  The wind-delivery system was high handed and remote, designed to be backed by top-down central government policy, not to have to win support bottom-up against local opposition.

Divided ‘Greens’

The environmental NGOs failed to organize constituency-level campaigns for wind, perhaps partly because they had relatively little engagement with Conservative voters, and perhaps in part because it was assumed that the provisions of their great achievement, the Climate Change Act, would ensure energy policy kept moving in the ‘right direction’.   The NGOs secured sustained cross party backing on climate policy (with the exception of UKIP) but not on energy policy.

The NGOs were also split, with local CPRE groups and sometimes the National Trust and Wildlife Trusts taking an active role in opposing wind farms, which in practice helped fuel and legitimize the Heaton-Harris campaign.

Most active NGO engagement focused on the readily achievable, such as promoting school or community renewables projects, or on advocacy of policy arguments rather than organizing.  There was for example, no demonstration of the scale of the wind or solar industry in terms of jobs, such as by bringing workers together when it was still a burgeoning business.  The wind industry and the green NGOs never turned overwhelmingly favourable public opinion into an effective lobby.   In contrast, although the anti-wind lobby represented just a tiny sliver of public opinion, when their activism was inserted into the machinery organised by Heaton Harris and his fellow travelers, it exerted enormous political leverage.

From Blown Away by the ECIU, 2017

‘Green Crap’, ‘Green Taliban’, ‘Green Blob’

If a British government is hell-bent on pushing through a policy and using its many opportunities to propagandize to support it, then unless there is some telling moment of conflict for opposition to rally around, it is almost impossible for civil society to withstand it.

In 2010 the Conservative Manifesto Conservative manifesto promised to ‘unleash the power of green enterprise and promote resource efficiency to generate thousands of green jobs’.  It spoke of ‘our responsibility to be the greenest government in our history’.  Its vision is for Britain was to be ‘the world’s first low-carbon economy’.  All that went out the window as the Tories aped UKIP.

With a political strategy of trying to out-UKIP-UKIP, Conservative Ministers did little to challenge the barrage of anti-environmental propaganda emanating from Nigel Farage, who for example wildly exaggerated the size of wind subsidies (six fold).  The new narrative about onshore wind held that at best, it was a necessary evil, and invariably an imposition on communities and a burden on electricity bill payers.

George Osborne used the 2011 Conservative Conference to denounce green regulation

In 2011 amidst widespread criticism of ‘austerity’, Chancellor George Osborne singled out “a decade of environmental laws and regulations” for “piling costs on the energy bills of households and companies”.   In 2012 Osborne took to calling green industries, environmental NGOs and government energy officials the “green Taliban”.    In 2013 Cameron told aides to “get rid of all the green crap” from energy bills.  Rather than fighting climate change by creating the world’s first low-carbon economy, investment in renewable energy was framed as a danger to be controlled.  Osborne had a ‘Levy Control Framework’ set up.  Opposing onshore wind farms became the poster-child for a more general abandonment of environmental ambition.  In 2014 Owen Patterson declared he was proud to have fought against environmental NGOs as Environment Secretary, denouncing them as the “green blob”.

On losing his job at DEFRA Owen Patterson MP denounced the “green blob” and then delivered a talk promoting fracking at the climate-sceptic front group the GWPF

Following Cameron’s capitulation to Heaton-Harris’s 101 Tories in 2012, Ministers adopted the framing of communities as victims of wind energy.  John Hayes, who Peter Lilley found “on my side” and “useful” at the Department of Energy, announced “we can no longer have wind turbines imposed on communities”.  In 2014 Energy Minister Michael Fallon promised that if the Conservatives were elected in 2015, “changes to planning rules will … give communities more power to reject onshore wind”.  In 2015 Kris Hopkins, a Conservative communities minister, said wind turbines could be “a blight on the landscape, harming the local environment and damaging heritage for miles around”.

The message was clear: the Conservatives were no longer on the green side but on the side of those who climate-sceptic journalist James Delingpole described as Shire Tories (or those aspiring to be) who believed ‘their country home …  is their castle’ and did not expect ‘to have their peace disturbed’, or ‘their views ruined’.

‘UKIP Can Deny Us A Majority With 5%’

On the other hand, to extract political benefits, the government still had to signal the political logic to its own followers.  Most of this can be found in conservative blogs and comment pieces in conservative newspapers citing ‘sources’.  For example in May 2012, the creator of ConservativeHome website Tim Montgomerie, who had previously explained the electoral benefits of Cameron’s green repositioning, warned:  “UKIP doesn’t need to get 10% to cause us damage. A 5% or 6% vote share will be enough to stop us winning many of the marginal seats that are necessary for a Conservative majority”.

The next month Benedict Brogan of the Daily Telegraph wrote that George Osborne would throw ‘red meat’ to party members and use finance to ‘kill’ onshore wind ‘stone dead’.

The Guardian reports a Greenpeace sting video in which Chris Heaton Harris explains how he arranged for an ‘anti wind’ candidate to stand in the 2012 Corby by-election, and “there’s a bit of strategy behind what’s going on”.

Other Conservatives were prepared to tolerate support for UKIP  so long the overall effect was to make the party more Euro- and Climate-sceptic, and anti-wind.  At the Corby by-election Heaton Harris was caught on camera by Greenpeace saying he “didn’t give a toss” if the ‘anti-wind candidate’ James Delingpole (who Heaton-Harris had helped to stand despite himself being the official manager of the Conservative campaign), was to endorse UKIP.  He simply wanted to get opposition to wind energy “written into the DNA” of the Tory Party.  His fellow East Midlands Conservative MP, arch Euro-sceptic Peter Bone, wrote in 2014 that UKIP was a ‘good thing’ because it would pull the Conservatives back to the right.

Bone, Farage and (right) Pursglove in Northamptonshire for the launch of GO Movement (Grassroots Out) a pro Brexit group, in 2016.  Bone and Pursglove both spoke at the UKIP Conference despite being Conservative MPs.  Photo from Northampton Chronicle 

Enough Wind Already

Many reports had it that Osborne and his Treasury team were pro-gas including fracking, and it suited them to divert financial support to the fossil fuel gas rather than wind.  At least in the short term, the growing public dislike of fracking was simply ignored, and once fracking development began, it was mainly in Labour not Conservative constituencies.

To maintain some claim to no longer be the ‘nasty’ party, Osborne ring-fenced funding for the NHS but sacrificed greenery.  Private polling may well have indicated that this was a bulwark against loss of Conservative votes to Labour, which was more important than any loss to the LibDems or Greens.

An awkward obstacle remained the statutory carbon budget system set up through the Climate Change Act which had become law in 2008 under the Climate Change Committee.  The clear logic of this is to reduce Britain’s carbon emissions and progressively decarbonize the economy.  But so long as the government could show overall emissions were falling (which they did, mainly because the final tranche of coal power stations was being closed down) the government could claim its climate policy was succeeding.

As well as overall emission targets and carbon budgets, the government had energy plans with targets and obscure sub-targets for proportions of power to be generated by renewables.  Chris Heaton Harris used these to frame onshore wind as having already received ‘too much’ funding. Then by focusing on the short not even the medium term, the government used this to justify withdrawing “subsidies”: it found a way to claim that there was already ‘enough wind’.  The reference target was 2020, and an end to finance was brought forward a year to 2016.

Political Consequences

Cameron and Osborne dropped wind energy in a short term bid to see off the Eurosceptic Tory right.  In the end it failed because the same lobby also forced them into an EU referendum which they lost.

ES we are out headline

Chris Heaton Harris became a government whip under Theresa May and then in 2018 a Minister in the Department for Exiting the European Union (DEXU) responsible for preparing for a no-deal Brexit, until he resigned on 3 April 2019 over a delay to Brexit.  Last year he caused outrage in Universities when he wrote asking for the names and notes of academics lecturing on Brexit.   According to his constituency website he is still campaigning against wind and offering to help local campaigners object to wind farms.

Voices That Were Not Heard

Since Cameron’s volte face became apparent in 2012, the wind industry, carbon finance and risk experts, NGOs, the Climate Change Committee and Parliamentary committees have repeatedly criticised the government for stifling onshore wind just as it has become the cheapest form of new energy.  They point to an opportunity cost: onshore wind offers huge economic and climate benefits, and lots of skilled jobs.  But finance for renewables projects and the wind-construction industry itself is highly mobile, so when there are more favourable opportunities elsewhere, the investment simply moves and its voice is no longer heard.

The larger wind companies are also invested in offshore wind, complicating their relationship with government which has been able to point to significant increases in offshore generation as a success story.  Plus although community energy schemes have been a victim of the jihad against wind, nearly all of Britain’s onshore wind has been delivered by large companies.  The paucity of community owned schemes (common in countries like Denmark) also meant that there were few community level voices raised to express support for wind when the campaign began.

Stirrings Of A Rethink

When Osborne and Cameron backed a reversal of policy on wind, Osborne in particular promoted fracking as an energy alternative. Quite aside from the obvious contradiction between a new dash-for-gas and climate policy, and the likely unpopularity of fracking locally, from the start, geologists had warned that the UK’s frackable gas resources were not comparable with those in the US.  They expressed doubts about the viability of the putative UK fracking industry.

By 2018 Cabinet Office documents unearthed by Greenpeace showed that whereas the shale gas industry had anticipated 4,000 horizontal wells by 2032, government projections now put the figure at just 155 by 2025.  For several years opposition by environment groups and local communities delayed any commercial fracking.  (In April 2019 INEOS and Quadrilla, the only firms to actually try fracking for gas in the UK, were lobbying for relaxations of earthquake rules, with INEOS saying it might pull out altogether).

Yet over the same time period of 2012 to 2019, costs of new onshore wind generation fell dramatically.  It was not surprising that this happened as the technology matured.  It had been predicted and the falling cost of onshore wind and solar pv was, after all, one reason the government was already considering a cut in ‘subsidies’ in 2012.

Even so, Together Against Wind was claiming in 2014 that ‘new forms’ of generation would cost twice as much as coal or nuclear (at £50/MWHr). By 2017 Arup said new onshore wind would be as cheap as gas and half the cost of nuclear at Hinkley.  The subsidy requirement for offshore wind, which was still allowed to compete in auctions, fell by 50% between 2015 and 2017.  In 2017, Cornwall Energy put the cost of new onshore wind at £40/MWH, others at £46/MWH, both less than new gas.   In 2018 the Climate Change Committee urged the government to use “simple, low-cost” options such as onshore wind and efficiency to cut emissions in the 2020s.  Ostensibly, it has always remained government policy to de-carbonize at ‘least cost’.

No doubt this prompted some in Whitehall to argue for policy on wind energy to be ‘revised’, although by now a lot of investor interest has been lost. In 2016 ENDS reported that the UK had dropped to an all-time low of 14th place in Ernst and Young’s ranking of country attractiveness for renewable energy Investment (behind Morocco, Brazil, Mexico and others). In 2018 the Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee called the fall in renewables investment “dramatic and worrying” and questioned the UK’s ability to meet its legally-binding carbon reduction targets.

Even in the Conservative Party, voices have once again been raised in support of onshore wind.  In 2017 Sam Hall from Bright Blue wrote at Conservative Home‘Polling shows ‘70 per cent of Conservatives are concerned about the impacts of climate change’  and ‘Conservatives have a more positive view of renewable energy forms like solar, tidal, offshore and onshore wind, and biomass, than they do of nuclear and fossil fuels. Even more remarkably, new onshore wind developments, which the last Conservative manifesto pledged to halt, are supported by a majority (59 per cent) of Conservatives, provided they did not receive any subsidy’. Also in 2017,  Simon Clarke, Conservative MP for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland wrote an article at Conservative Home: The case for lifting the national bar on onshore wind’.

It seems that like Europe, wind energy is a political football within the Conservative Party, and is being kicked about by the same two sides.  In 2018 the Daily Telegraph reported that the row over onshore wind ‘threatens to re-ignite’ within the Tory party after ‘energy ministers Claire Perry and Richard Harrington alarmed their backbench colleagues by revealing that they are working on ways to support future projects.’

Some Tories open to onshore wind: Claire Perry MP, Richard Harrington MP, Sam Hall of Bright Blue and Simon Clarke MP

In 2018 Business and Energy secretary Greg Clark announced that the “energy trilemma” was “coming to an end”. Cheap power, ‘ he said “is now green power”.  Zero subsidy say Clark should be a principle, and “it is looking now possible, indeed likely, that by the mid 2020s, green power will be the cheapest power. It can be zero subsidy”.

It would probably be wrong however to imagine that the Civil Service is wholly impartial or united on this topic, or that economic and ecological rationality outweighs values judgements or ideology in Westminster, and therefore onshore wind power is now certain to be re-started.  

For one thing, a decade of sustained anti-wind propaganda has left a mental footprint in the perceptions of MPs.  A July 2018 YouGov found just 8% of them knew that onshore wind farms are now the cheapest new source of electrical generation. 12% thought it was nuclear.  They also overestimated opposition to onshore wind.  The latest government survey showed just 2% strongly oppose onshore wind but only 9% of MPs believed the figure to be less than 5%.  Most guessed that ‘strong opposition’ was above 20%.

Source: Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker, BEIS – from Chris Goodall’s blog

Source: Energy and Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker, BEIS from Chris Goodall’s blog

In 2017 a detailed analysis of the long-running government tracker poll on wind by Chris Goodall, blogger at ‘Carbon Commentary’ revealed that ‘just 1 person between 16 and 44 from the entire interview panel [of 2000] was ‘strongly opposed’ to wind’.  Goodall wrote: ‘Across all age ranges, wind seems to be rising in popularity. The only group with more than a few opponents are those over 65. And yet the reduction in those opposing onshore wind has been fastest in this age range. Media coverage shouldn’t start from the assumption that people don’t like turbines. Wind power is popular. Vastly more popular than fracking’.

I’m told that confronted with this evidence and even the fact that onshore wind is more popular in rural than urban areas, a senior Conservative MP just flatly refused to believe it as it did not reflect his postbag.  The obvious explanation is an effective and well organized campaign of a very few people made to appear like a lot.

In autumn 2018 energy blogger Professor David Toke asserted that the Treasury still aimed to change policy so that ‘almost all future development for renewable energy in the UK will be stopped. Continued incentives and tax breaks for nuclear power, shale gas and conventional power stations will, however, remain in place.’ It wanted to end Contracts for a Difference (CfDs),  end ‘all incentives to solar pv, including for solar power exported to the electricity distribution system’, and ‘the carbon price floor which makes fossil fuel more expensive and non-fossil sources relatively cheaper’.  The war is far from over and as things stand, the anti-wind lobby is winning.

Enemies of Science and Regulation

Matt Reed’s blog investigating UKIP and wind

‘Reflexivity’ and ‘reflexive modernity’ is an esoteric idea but an important part of it is that society reinvents itself and its systems by acting on scientific advances in understanding.   As Matt Reed wrote in a 2016 blog, UKIP’s online propaganda activity on wind farms it is part of an anti-reflexive backlash or counter-revolution, in which scientific knowledge and understanding is rejected.  This is why it aligns with same psychological, political and ideological divide as, for example, climate scepticism and rejection of scientific evidence about the dangers of smoking.  He quotes Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, in their book (and film) Merchants of Doubt, How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming:   “the enemies of government regulation of the marketplace became the enemies of science”.

From Roger Helmer’s blog

Farage doing a bit of values signalling (the packaging refers to health warnings)

So the staying of wind in England is very much about an interruption of modernity and a sacrifice of the public interest in favour of those private interests with a vested interest in perpetuating the profitable conditions of the past.  Which is why it is not surprising that rejection of the seemingly apolitical option of onshore wind power became a symbol in the service of ‘Euroscepticism’, and a way to actualize a dream of how some would like the world to be (we don’t need renewable energy), rather than how it needs to be (actually we do).

Conspiracy Footnote

There was obviously a co-ordinated campaign by ERG members and other Conservative right-wingers to get the Cameron government to drop wind, and then a campaign by many of the same MPs, in collusion with Ministers, to dismantle the onshore wind industry in England.  This seems to have involved Tory right-wingers well beyond Heaton Harris, such as Peter Lilley.

But was there a conspiracy or an organised effort with foreign influence behind the killing of the wind in England?   I don’t know.  More like a convergence of interests perhaps.

Reed suggests that opportunism rather than strategy explains the largely imaginary mobilization of a ‘rural vote’ by UKIP but the line between opportunism and planned action, is a rather grey one, as has been the line between UKIP and the right wing of the Tory Party.

It is true that there is a trail of breadcrumbs which certainly show connections.   The political bonds between players such as ALEC in the US who Heaton Harris asked for help from in his political project and who responded positively (what the help was, we don’t know), and Bjorn Lomborg and his fellow Eurosceptics like Liam Fox and Roger Helmer and Daniel Hanahan are real enough.  As were theirs also to the US right-wing.   As are the links between the climate sceptics of Tufton Street in London and the US right-wing funders, and those from them to the fossil fuel industry (sometimes one and the same).  NGOs like Desmog and journalists like George Monbiot have spent a much longer time looking into the Eurosceptic-Climatesceptic ecosystem.

As to Heaton Harris’s links to Trump whom he hoped would speak at an ill-fated fundraiser for his campaign front ‘Together Against Wind’ back in 2012, was that imaginary or real?   Trump, he told putative donors, was one of his ‘biggest supporters’.

One of my ‘biggest supporters’ wrote Heaton Harris in a mailer for an anti-wind fundraiser

At the other extreme perhaps, it may be just a coincidence of values, the politics of property interests, and the unintended side effects of the NPPF, which brought together groups like the CPRE and the Eurosceptic-Climatesceptic right-wing, through figures such as David Montagu-Smith.  He was Chairman of West Northamptonshire CPRE and is and was Chairman of Rathlin Energy, an oil and gas firm involved in fracking.

David Montagu Smith of CPRE and Rathlin Energy (from a Protect Our North Coast video)

Protect Our North Coast opposed fracking development by Rathlin in Northern Ireland

Others don’t think it is coincidence, for instance Renewable energy consultant Alison Fogg.  She wrote at Spin Watch about her experiences of anti-wind campaigning in the South West in  ‘Connecting The Dots: A Firsthand Account Of How The UKIP Surge Drove The Tories To Sabotage The Renewables Industry’.  That describes how in 2014 she found that it was almost impossible to get positive press coverage in the local North Devon Journal because of links between UKIP, the “Slay The Array” campaign against an offshore wind farm, and the local branch of the CPRE, whose chair, Penny Evans, had stood for UKIP.  She recalls that: ‘At one Slay the Array meeting, a 59-year-old supporter of the Array plans was ejected after asking too many questions. This man was then beaten up. And that was at a renewable energy event’.  The main suspect ‘was described by police as “wearing a purple jacket with a UKIP badge”’.

The US right-wing still funds anti-renewables campaigns and the authoritarian anti-modern British right – such as the ERG and UKIP – which so successfully inflamed Settler reflexes, has links to its American cousins.  They share a joint dislike of the ‘progressive’ public interest politics of the EU, making them bedfellows over Brexit.  It is their attitudes and beliefs rather than that of the people of England who have so far won out in determining energy policy.

View a timeline in slides:


[1] ‘Security-driven’ with an unmet need for safety, security and identity.  As a result they are cautious and change-averse (change being a risk), and seek certainty, leading them to generally conclude that things should be left as they are, or preferably returned to the past, the ‘good old days’.  Settlers desire to be ‘normal’ and are pained by change if it redefines normal and requires them to change in order to stay ‘normal’.  This social conservatism has always predisposed Settlers to resist or avoid new technologies as long as possible, to uphold tradition and to seek out reassurance in terms of continuity, from recreations and food to manners and social signals in general that cultural continuity is being conserved.

This makes Settlers ‘naturally’ averse to obvious new changes such as large white wind turbines appearing in their local landscape.  Later once these are normal, Settlers may become guardians of the new normal – exactly this happened with old style windmills, originally opposed as foreign intrusions, now treasured heritage.

Many Settlers also have a strong sense of local identity and resist changes to it, whether rapid cultural change in the shape of visibly different immigrants, or new developments that make a place ‘unrecognizable’.



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Brexit Values Story 2.2: Brexit Warning

Brexit Warning  (Brexit Values Story 2.2)            

(long blog – download as a pdf here)

Brexit is causing a crisis in British politics but the values split which it revealed could affect many other countries, particularly post-industrial democracies.  Those countries experienced what Ron Inglehart called the ‘Silent Revolution’ of progressive values in the 1960s and 1970s, which became part of a mainstream consensus.  However they are now susceptible to counter-revolutions such as Brexit, the rise of authoritarian populism and ‘anti progressive’ protest movements such as the Yellow Vests.  These changes raise serious questions for politics but also for the model of ‘progressive’ campaigning which has become conventional since the 1970s.

For campaigners I suggest the three main ‘values-lessons of Brexit’ are:

  1. The change model: for change to have sufficient legitimacy to last, it must respect values diversity. By this I mean that it must be endorsed through adoption in all the main values groups of society (Pioneer, Prospector and Settler), on their own terms. Values-bombing (eg PCness) does not do this.

  2. Progressives should design and invest in campaigns to engage people unlike themselves and avoid the default mobilisation of their fundraising base as the way to win campaigns.

  3. Politicians, governments and campaigners must work actively to maintain the ‘social elastic’ of common experiences, inter-dependencies and behaviours with cross-values appeal to prevent society dividing into disconnected values silos, not just online but in real life.

Brexit Car Crash

The immediate British crisis over Brexit (March 2019) hinges on how to implement the results of the 2016 referendum on membership of the EU.  As explored in Brexit Values Story Part 1 and Part 2.1, the vote split the country on values lines but in so doing, it has also split the two main political parties, Conservative and Labour, into ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ camps.  As Leave-Remain public opinion is ranged not along a left-right axis but a values axis from Settler to Pioneer, or in Ingleharts terms from Authoritarian/ materialist to New Politics (post-materialist), this has also split the main parties, and that has  disabled and destabilised Westminster politics, leading to a slow-motion political car crash of epic proportions.

Diagram from British Politics is Undergoing a Values Realignment

One reason Britain’s negotiation with the EU has been so agonizing is that political choices have separated as values choices but both Theresa May (Conservative) and Jeremy Corbyn (Labour) have tried to suppress this reality as they prioritize keeping their parties intact.

As I described in the February blog Britain Is Undergoing A Values Realignment, defections from the main parties have led to the emergence of one new political grouping:  the TIG The Independent Group, now a nascent political party to be called ‘ChangeUK’, in the same Pioneer values territory as the Liberal Democrats and Greens (and most Labour voters).

At the opposite pole, UKIP is now joined by the ‘Brexit Party’, and their values are similar those of the Ulster DUP which May has depended upon for a working majority, and the ERG or European Research Group.  The latter are regarded as a party-within-a-party at the extreme right of the Conservatives.

This realignment process is not finished yet and will occupy the attention of political media but the underlying values dynamics are more important for the future of campaigns.

Not Just in Britain?

Public opinion in both Britain and most of Europe has swung to be more not less pro-EU since the UK Referendum (probably out of horror at the consequences of Brexit and counting the benefits of EU membership) but the underlying pattern of pro- and anti-EU sentiment that was revealed by pre-referendum surveys and confirmed in the vote, is also found in some other European countries.

The UK values split over Europe disproportionately pitched Pioneers and Now People Prospectors against Golden Dreamers and Settlers thus splitting the values map across the middle (see explanation in Brexit Values Story Part 1 with the voting data in Brexit Values Story Part 2.1).  This was evident as a social values cleavage in other EU Member States such as Italy, France (yellow vests, Front National) and Germany (AfD) before Brexit.  It’s just not been activated in the same way in those countries (and doesn’t by the way apply in Spain).

Leave Remain data as values terrain maps from Brexit Values Story Part 2.1 – it’s not just Britain which could split over Europe along values lines

The Great Inversion

Campaigners are used to thinking of themselves as the ‘insurgents’.  They forged effective strategies on this basis in the mass media age of the 1960s – 1980s.  Their role was to be non-governmental organisations, pressuring and showing the way.  Government would then deliver and politicians would do the necessary politics to embed and secure change.

As most campaigners are Pioneers, they also have the highest sense of self-agency and are most comfortable with risking controversy or failure, allowing them to also be innovators.  So although todays long-established campaign groups truly were innovators and insurgents back in the 1970s, today their values group may still be the social innovators but they are politically no longer the insurgents.  This is because the ‘values pyramid’ as deduced by Abraham Maslow in the 1950s, has been turned upside down.

Society as it was deduced by Abraham Maslow (top) and probably was for millennia (bottom) – the ‘pyramid’ of the three main values-needs groups.  When most of society was security-driven (Settler) it had inbuilt social ballast, ‘tribal’ loyalties, relatively predictable behaviours and deference to authority.

The inversion of the ‘pyramid’ of values groups as measured by CDSM between 1973 and 2016. (Slides from Brexit Values Story Part 1)  In the UK Pioneers went from the smallest to the largest group and their ideas from fringe to mainstream.  Settlers felt an increasingly marginalised minority. The proportion of Pioneers is even higher in some other developed countries (eg Australia, Germany and the US).

This inversion happened through the natural values dynamic of people transitioning from one dominant values set to another if they meet their needs for safety, security, identity and then esteem of others and self esteem.  In the ‘good times’ of improving real prospects, better social and economic conditions and greater opportunities, these  ‘intergenerational’ changes as Inglehart calls them, or  the ‘values conveyor’ as CDSM term it, led to more people meeting their security needs and esteem needs, with the result that by 2016 far more had become Prospectors or Pioneers than in the 1970s.

Innovators But Not Insurgents

Most change-campaigns across the world are dominated by Pioneers (the values mechanisms of how this happens are detailed in this blog on the ‘Usual Suspects’).  As a group, Pioneers were always in the vanguard of change but now, even if not in themselves an outright majority, they are often the largest values group in developed democracies.  Furthermore, many of their ideas have been consolidated in a mainstream consensus.  If they are joined, as they often are, by the Now People Prospectors, they are even more likely to form an outright majority.

This raises the question of what change strategies such groups should adopt today.  The insurgent positioning is a piece of cultural baggage which may not be optimal if you are representing the mainstream.  At the very least, if you do not bother to win the support of smaller values groups very unlike you, it makes you vulnerable to being perceived as part of a disinterested establishment.

As the largest values group, Pioneers are sometimes capable of exerting a values-hegemony: they may have the power to project their values at others, manifest as Political Correctness, which in values terms is a sort of ethical force-projection or ‘values bombing’.   Resentment of PCness was a strong predictor of voting for Trump in the US and in the UK the equivalent was rejection of ‘isms’ like feminism and environmentalism amongst Leave voters.  Some of the strategies and tactics of campaign and cause groups – and ‘progressive movements’ – may have themselves contributed to values-polarisation, although compared to the effects of job insecurity and immigration identified by Inglehart, their precipitating contribution to Brexit would have been marginal (see Political Correctness, Brexit, Trump and Campaigns).

Activation of ‘PC’ and a values divide – from  A Possible History of Political Correctness in Values Terms

End stage from A Possible History of Political Correctness in Values Terms – opposition to PCness in the US was a powerful predictor of voting Trump while in the UK the equivalent for Leave was opposition to ‘isms’s such as multiculturalism, feminism, environmentalism.

A great deal of effective campaigning depends upon having natural justice onside.  It hardly needs saying that many of the opponents of progressive causes plainly do not.  For example the fossil fuel industry continues to exploit its entrenched financial influence over politics – especially but only in the United States – to enable to it continue doing incalculable damage.  But as ‘progressive’ groups gain greater mainstream influence, directly or indirectly, they need to engage more not just in pointing to desirable destinations but in the delivery of sustainable change.  This means securing a mandate for change from all the main values groups.

The Natural Change Dynamic

The natural human dynamic for the sustainable spread of change across values groups, requires its voluntary adoption, by emulation from Pioneers to Prospectors, and then by norming from Prospectors to Settlers.  This requires more work than simply generating support from within the 38% [UK] of Pioneers but achieving it means values endorsement, the opposite of a values split.

The first step requires the behaviour (or idea) to appear successful to Prospectors.  The second step requires it to appear ‘normal’ to Settlers (sufficiently familiar and widely adopted).  This has to be on people’s own terms, which requires respecting their values (to be successful and to be normal, respectively), and not trying to project Pioneer values onto them (Political Correctness).  It’s about strategic enabling of behaviour change, not ‘changing minds’ or imposing values.  It means accepting that people may do the same thing, for different reasons.

Slide 12 from Brexit Values Story Part 1 taken from What Makes People Tick: The Three Hidden Worlds of Settlers, Prospectors and Pioneers

Resorting to projecting your own reasons and calling on others to adopt them,  is usually motivated by a desire to get change to happen quickly fast but rather than catalysing change, Pioneer projection at Settlers or Prospectors tends to act as a blocker, like a catalytic poison deactivating change.  If forced upon people, it can cause a backlash of active rejection.

Attempts to project Pioneer values at Settlers or Prospectors rather than emulation and norming. Slide 53  from Brexit Values Story Part 1

Although the natural change dynamic can happen quite quickly (as with consumer goods and styles) it may appear ‘too slow’ for campaigners dealing with ‘urgent issues’.  It’s attractive then to find ways to produce significant outcomes without involving the voluntary social spread of ideas or behaviours.  The problem with this is that if the changes are vulnerable to reversal, they have no supportive ‘constituency’ to defend them, and there is no more entrenched form of approval than one embedded by daily participation or familiar behaviour, because we all tend to rationalise and defend our behaviours as ‘making sense’ (Track 1).

This is also why if something is adopted through individual choice without us being made aware that  it’s something others think we ought to do, it is likely to spread more efficiently.  The main mechanism for doing this is often the market in products and services.  The spread of rooftop solar pv in the UK followed just this pattern, albeit a decade after Germany.

From the 1970s until the 1990s solar pv in Britain was confined to Pioneer projects and campaign demonstrations (eg Greenpeace 1997 x2, above).  By the late 1990s experimentally minded green architects were putting in larger solar pv installations (eg BedZed 2000), inspired by the German example led by politician Herman Scheer.  In 2001 (yellow building) our house was the first with solar pv and thermal in our town – which led to curious locals knocking on our door to ask if it worked.   UK Feed in Tariffs did not come in until 2010, so at this time the householder motivation to use solar in the UK was ‘ethical’.

Over the next decade solar pv became aspirational.  Prospectors started to get it along with Pioneers.   A major influence in the UK was a tv programme ‘Grand Designs’ which featured many ‘dream’ homes with solar.  The out-take was ‘rich successful people are doing this’.  In 2006 Arnie Schwarzenegger, Governor of California launched a million solar roofs programme.  Green minded celebrities installed it, providing fashionable endorsement.  Mainstream brands like Curry’s appeared with domestic solar at the Ideal Home Exhibition.

By the 2010s solar pv was no longer novel but becoming normal.  Conservative UK Settler brands like Anglia Windows offered it.  In this case the selling point was not ethical climate-saving but the risk-avoiding strength of the brackets fixing it to the roof, in case of extreme weather.  Around the corner from my house, a UKIP voter (sometimes he flies a UKIP flag – UKIP’s base is Settler) put in a large solar pv installation.  Normalisation: he assured me it would pay for his pension.

This process of Pioneer innovation, success-bridging to the (Now People) Prospectors through emulation, and eventual norming  and uptake by Settlers, is the usual way new things spread across society, if they are going to.  Key to the contagion is that people adopt it for their own reasons (values).

Had Prospectors been told by Pioneers that they were wrong bad people not to have solar pv, their answer would probably have been “get lost”.   Had Prospectors told Settlers they should get it to be fashionable, the response might have been similar.  Settlers are not smitten by fashion.

Had it become a politically charged ‘wedge issue’ (which in the UK has happened with onshore wind power when the Conservatives dropped it and adopted UKIP style anti-wind policy, distancing themselves from their Liberal Democrat coalition partners), it would not have spread so effectively.  A campaign of ethical values projection could have stymied the spread of solar pv in the UK outside of the Pioneers.

Had solar not ended up on the rooftops of so many Conservative and even UKIP voters, it might have experienced the same fate as onshore wind.

Although the two are different in that small scale solar is less visible than a large wind turbine, onshore wind could become a values-hate-symbol in England partly because local individuals were not ‘bought into it’ in the same way as communities were in countries such as Germany and Denmark where there was a high degree of community ownership.  It just appeared in their area, they had no personal connection and there was no way for local residents to make a positive connection.

This meant there was no local human constituency endorsing and identifying with wind, making it easier to ‘other’ as an alien presence, and to dislike.  At least in England, at local level it is having to oppose a person which often stops potential activists doing anything about an activity that really troubles them: for example, hating to see farmers flailing hedgerows but not wanting to confront any individual farmer.

A UK example with practical consequences for climate campaigners, is the setback to greening Britain’s economy and tackling climate change, caused by the abandonment of its premier source of renewable energy: onshore wind.

Until 2012 onshore wind (the cheapest form of new renewable electricity and now the cheapest of any form) was promoted by all UK governments.  The only party to oppose it was UKIP, for whom it was one of three values-signature policies (the other two being opposition to immigration and withdrawal from the EU).

Chris Heaton Harris MP, climate- and euro-sceptic slayer of wind energy (photo Chris McAndrew)

Then a campaign organised by right-wing Conservative politician Chris Heaton-Harris, Chair of the ERG, forced Prime Minister David Cameron to kill off onshore wind energy in England.  With it went Cameron’s whole ‘reflexive’ project to green and modernize the Conservatives (and attract more Pioneers and Prospectors), begun in 2005.  By 2015 the Conservatives had an anti-wind energy policy like that of UKIP, driven by competition between the two parties for the approval of a tiny, almost entirely Settler group of older right-wing voters, who were also climate-sceptic, euro-sceptic and against immigration.  Opposing wind energy became a values-standard raised in the campaign to take Britain out of the European Union – with the Conservatives co-opted into UKIP’s ‘anti-reflexive’ counter revolution so that they could grab the standard and wave it themselves.

Ultimately of course it all went wrong for Cameron.  He threw wind energy overboard to please the Euro/climate-sceptic right, along with other concessions but he then lost the referendum and resigned.  Britain is left with an energy policy which supposedly mandates the use of the most cost effective technologies to decarbonize its economy on the one hand, while simultaneously ruling them out on the other.  It’s a mess although only a small satellite of the Brexit mess.

Lessons for Campaigning

Campaign groups should design campaigns to avoid contributing the Brexit-type values divides in society and to reach across values differences to engage people unlike themselves. To secure sustainable positive change, they should respect a diversity of motivational values, and NGOs should press and support governments to maintain values cohesion within society.  For me the three principal campaigning take-aways from the Brexit divide are:

  1. For Lasting Change Embrace Values Diversity

As discussed above, plan to introduce and embed change by using the natural values dynamic of Pioneer to Prospector by emulation (typically with Transcender Pioneers to Now People Prospectors as ‘the bridge’) and then Prospector to Settler, by norming.  (In countries with a large Prospector population, such as many developing countries, the key change is often from Now People to Golden Dreamer, again by emulation).  Do not try to speed this up by projecting Pioneer values at Prospectors or Settlers (including through admonishment in Political Correctness).  That’s likely to be resented and to prompt values divides, as evidenced by research by Greenberg in the US (Trump election) and Ashcroft in the UK (EU Referendum).

Enable people to adopt change for their own reasons, rather than trying to change the people.  Our Values Modes result from our life experiences, not from a conscious choice or being told what our values should be.  Afford values diversity in the same respect as you would to ethnic, cultural or other social diversity.

  1. Invest in Audiences Unlike Yourselves.

Because campaigns often cannot be conducted without reaching a point where actors and followers ‘take sides’, the default should be to maximise engagement with unlike values and social groups.  This is the opposite of just mobilising those who already most support your cause or organisation and of ‘identity politics’ campaigning.

A good example of a winning referendum campaign on a potentially divisive issue which did this was the Irish Yes Equality campaign of 2015.  That effort is unusually well documented in the book Ireland Says Yes by Gráinne Healy.    Every strategic step that campaign took had the effect of reducing rather than increasing difference between the ‘two sides’.

The three greatest obstacles to this for campaign NGOs are all mundane.  First, the reluctance of many campaigners to engage positively with anyone outside their base.  Second, the default use of the fundraising base as the mobilisation base for campaigns, because it’s easy and cheap (and in the worst case, if a change campaign is instructed to raise money).  Third, even where a campaign does actually do research into what might induce the disinterested or opposed to become supportive, it is of no value unless the results are acted upon (as Yes Equality did).

Above: my summary of the Yes strategy.  If the Remain campaign had adopted a similar approach I think it would have won at the 2016 UK EU Referendum

  1. Maintain The Social Elastic

Several studies have shown that since the ‘European Referendum’, being a ‘leaver’ or ‘remainer’ has become a stronger identity factor than being a supporter of one of the two main British political parties, Conservative and Labour.  This is not so dramatic as it might sound.  In reality politics was always way down the list of identity factors for people in the UK:  ‘my political convictions’ ranked 27th of 31 options in a large 2014 survey, which may not have surprised anyone except some tribal political activists.    Also in reality, smaller parties such as UKIP (strongly Settler) and the Liberal Democrats (strongly Pioneer) have always had more distinct values bases.

It also has to be borne in mind that not all Pioneers voted Remain (54% did), and not all Settlers voted Leave (65% did), and Prospectors were both the most divided and the least likely to have voted (15% didn’t).

(Above: Table from Brexit Values Story 2.1 – see post for fuller explanation).

But as is always the case, values differences were most pronounced amongst those with the strongest convictions, who most ‘make the weather’ in social issues and politics.  Overall, the EU referendum and its aftermath have, so far at least, almost certainly increased rather than decreased perceptions of difference between values groups.  Numerous pollsters suggest that views have tended to polarise, although there is now a consistent lead for ‘Remain’ of around 8%, which is why the Leave side doesn’t like the idea of a Second Referendum.  Media imagery of course, promotes archetypes.  Many demonstrations and their online equivalents have led both sides into polarised self-parody:  xenophobic angry nationalism amongst Settler/ Golden Dreamer Leavers, contrasting with smug, sneering disdain for Leavers from Pioneer Remainers.

One of the better non-smug non-sneery placards from the vast gathering of mainly Pioneers at the 1m plus march for a sceond referendum in London on March 23

I believe that a lesson Government, politicians and NGOs should all take from this is that it is important promote cohesion between values groups, and maintain the ‘social elastic’ which keeps people with different values together or at least in contact.  There is a considerable risk that if and when the country ‘calms down’, this will be forgotten, and with it many of those who were rightly or wrongly led into blaming the EU for their problems but who had very justifiable reasons to feel forgotten and unfairly treated by life.

At a practical level, and nothing to do with the particulars of Britain and the EU, social bonds across values groups are created through real-life inter-dependencies and common experiences, such as reliance on public services (and in the UK, the NHS especially).  Many of these are susceptible to public policy, for example by making public rather than private transport the best option for travel.  Or by encouraging and celebrating activities with wide values resonance such as, in the UK, charity or community projects to benefit children, or caring for nature, or by promoting inter-generational connections, for instance within families, around the prospects of the next generation.

Another practical risk faced by anyone trying to redress values divides will be to reach for social media as the quick and cheap option.  Unfortunately the algorithmic online ecosystem and culture of most social media tends to create the exact opposite effect.  Wifi-free and mobile network-free zones might have a beneficial effect!

NGOs can catalyse or demonstrate such efforts but they should be a basic duty of governments, and achieving that in itself requires reaching across values differences in politics itself.  Once the elastic snaps, trust disappears and society risks a descent into unpredictable cultural warfare.

Slide 15  from Brexit Values Story Part 1

Slide 14  from Brexit Values Story Part 1 

Exploring New Politics

It’s no good expecting a good reading of philosophers, or economic tracts from Karl Marx, J M Keynes, Adam Smith or Thomas Pikkety to tell us how to tackle problems of values conflict.  These are the condundra of ‘new politics’, and occur where psychological values, politics, cultural change and economics come together.

In 1977 Ron Inglehart (of the University of Michigan and inventor of the World Values Survey) wrote a book about politics and values called The Silent Revolution. By  “silent revolution” he meant the rise of progressive values.  Or as the book blurb put it, ‘a gradual but fundamental change to political life throughout the Western world’ which included ‘a shift from an overwhelming emphasis on material values and physical security toward greater concern with the quality of life; and an increase in the political skills of Western publics that enables them to play a greater role in making important political decisions’.

Slide 35 from Brexit Values Story Part 1

That describes the values-conveyor-effect of the post-war ‘good times’ described in Brexit Values Story Part 1, up to the 1970s.  From then on,  small-state Reagan-Thatcherism, neoliberal economics and globalisation started to reduce the real wealth and prospects of many workers and then of the economic ‘middle classes’, both in Britain and the US.  The same has happened in some other first- generation industrial countries.  This in turn began to trigger a push back from those who did not like the way that the system was changing.

In their 2018 post-Brexit book, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin credit Pero Ignazi of Bologna University as being one of the first to notice a social and political backlash against the silent revolution.  In 1992 Ignazi published The Silent Counter Revolution Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe [which is short and worth reading].  He charted the rise of Extreme Rightwing Parties or ERPs, most of which were not in the old fascist mould but a new breed with ‘a right-wing antisystem attitude’.

Ignazi found that by the 1980s, European politics was increasingly volatile, old party ties were ‘decomposing’, voters were losing interest and parties were losing members, ‘and established parties … progressively fading away, thus enabling the emergence of new parties and/or new agencies for the aggregation of demands’.

Social and economic change had ‘liberated the citizen’, and encouraged ‘self-affirmation (as opposed to group solidarity)’ so voting was ‘no longer the confirmation of ‘belonging’ to a specific social group but becomes an individual choice (not necessarily a rational one), an affirmation of a personal value system: the ‘issue voter’ tends to replace the traditional ‘party identification voter’.

‘It could be said’ wrote Ignazi, that the Greens and the ERPs were ‘respectively, the legitimate and the unwanted children of the New Politics; as the Greens come out of the silent revolution, the ERPs derive from a reaction to it, a sort of ‘silent counter-revolution’.’

Inglehart has recently attempted to resolve the effects of values and economic effects in his book Cultural Evolution and a paper The Silent Revolution in Reverse: Trump and the Xenophobic Authoritarian Populist Parties (also here).  Inglehart writes:

‘During the past three decades, a growing share of the publics of high-income countries has experienced declining real income and job security, in context with a large flow of immigrants. This has fueled support for xenophobic populist authoritarian movements such as British exit from the European Union, France’s National Front and Donald Trump’s rise to power. The Silent Revolution dynamic is still at work, but it is now moving in reverse’.

He explains:

‘Support for xenophobic populist authoritarian movements is mainly motivated by a backlash against cultural change. Since the 1970s, younger Postmaterialist birth cohorts have disproportionately supported socially liberal environmentalist parties, while older, less secure people supported xenophobic authoritarian parties, in an enduring intergenerational value clash. But rising inequality, declining existential security and massive immigration explain why support for these movements is greater now than it was thirty years ago. We are dealing with a combination of intergenerational value change and two mega period effects’

The two ‘mega period effects’ are cultural change and in particular immigration, and deteriorating real economic prospects for many people.  The same phenomenon of response to a perception of rapid cultural change has been described by Karen Stenner in The Authoritarian Dynamic, Jonathan Haidt and Eric Kaufmann.

Both these effects are susceptible to political intervention.  For example in the UK, the current delivery mechanisms of government policy on resettlement of aslum seekers and refugees leads to them mostly being sent to poorer areas, which are already stressed by multiple disadvantages causing insecurity. In these areas job prospects are usually worse than in richer areas and social housing is inadequate, and the so the very communities most likely to experience an authoritarian response are also being challenged to accommodate cultural change.  (Of course most immigrants are not refugees but policy influences often have similar effects for them too).

Inglehart notes that in these five European countries, support for xenophobic authoritarian parties fell to a low of 5% in the 1960s but from 1970 as income inequality and economic insecurity increased, ‘the vote for authoritarian parties rose to more than 12% of the total in the 2010s’.  He writes:

Economic growth has continued since 1975, but in high-income countries virtually all of the gains have gone to those at the top  … Cultural backlash explains why given individuals support xenophobic populist authoritarian movements– but declining existential security explains why support for these movements is greater now than it was thirty years ago.

His new book Cultural Backlash: Trump Brexit and Authoritarian Populism written with Pippa Norris, has now been published. Inglehart says it show that this effect ‘explains the rise of Authoritarian Populist parties in dozens of other countries’.  In other words, that immigration/cultural change combines with economic factors which undermine the sense of security and achievement (relative not absolute), to drive an increase in ‘materialist’ values and support for authoritarian populist options.

Both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ need to address the problem of inequalities of opportunity and outcomes between values groups, not just between socio-economic, ethnic, geographic or other divisions traditionally identified in ‘old politics’.  Feelings of unfairness and injustice which coincide with values differences are deeper, more easily polarised and harder to de-escalate than those which cross values differences.  Unfortunately the Remain-Leave divide shows signs of having become just one such, hence the deep sense of unfairness between Remainers who see the referendum as a case of mis-selling by Leave and so illegitimate, and Leavers who see Parliamentary failure to deliver the Brexit they ‘expected’, as a betrayal.

These issues of insecurity intersecting with values differences aren’t going away any time soon and won’t  just affect the poorest and the traditional ‘working class’.  Inglehart goes on to argue that unless checked by policy, the experience of lost job security will soon extend to almost everyone outside the very rich, due to fundamental changes in how economies work.  It has already been driven by the rise of the knowledge economy (favouring the educated), and is now being propelled by automation but will increasingly be caused by the spread of AI, which promises to replace humans in ‘judgement’ and professional roles ranging from medicine to the law.

My next blog will focus on the rise and fall of David Cameron’s green experiment at the hands of British Conservatives Euro- and Climate-sceptics who went on to bring about Brexit, and the role played by values.

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British Politics Is Undergoing A Values Realignment

download as a pdf

The main British political parties, Labour and Conservative, are large ‘broad-church’, ‘catch-all’, or ‘big tent’ parties.  They are now experiencing their first splintering based more on values cleavages than political ideology.  At the time of writing, eight Labour and three Conservative MPs have quit to form a block of ‘Independents’.  Both parties have broken because they have grounded on the rock of ‘Brexit’.

More MPs may or may not follow but thanks to the deep values-based schism created by the EU Referendum, it’s likely that the UK is seeing the start of a significant political realignment.  As the FT said today (20th February 2019), it means, ironically, that Britain’s politics are becoming more like those of Europe.

Here’s what’s going on in values terms, using the simple two-dimensional model of Ron Inglehart of the World Values Survey.  Instead of a one-dimensional political spectrum (as the House of Commons is literally built to accommodate), it’s two dimensional.

(From The Silent Revolution in Reverse, Inglehart et al 2018)

Here’s the same again with my own annotations.

For readers outside the UK, the reason these defections from Labour and Conservative are significant is that they could change the political arithmetic of ‘Brexit’ which is at a crucial stage.

The ERG (European Research Group) is a network of right-wing Eurosceptic and usually climate-sceptic MPs, founded in 1993 to fight against European integration.  The current Chairman is Jacob Rees Mogg MP.  A previous Chairman, Chris Heaton-Harris MP, played a central role in a campaign within the Conservatives to force then-Prime Minister David Cameron to abandon onshore wind farms, the cheapest form of renewable energy and regarded as crucial to decarbonization of the UK.  Heaton-Harris is a devotee of climate sceptic Bjorn Lomborg and now a  Minister in the Department for Exiting the European Union.

The ERG has been pulling the Conservatives rightwards and UKIP-wards and exploiting the values overlap between the extreme right voters for the Conservative Party and the anti-Europe pro-coal anti-wind, anti-immigration party UKIP, to do so.  Both renewable energy and the European Union are part of so-called ‘reflexive modernization’, new ways of doing things (eg sustainability) which Cameron tried to promote in his early phase of ‘detoxifying’ the Conservative Party.  He had to abandon that to stop the party splitting over Europe, and to retain his leadership.

The UK voted 48.1% Remain and 51.9% Leave in the 2016 Referendum (margin of 3.8%).  Legally that was only advisory but Cameron (who expected Remain to win) had pledged to act on the result.   He then resigned.  In Parliament the Conservatives and Labour are both split over Europe.  Since July 2017 a majority of the country have swung (increasingly) to be pro-Remain (analysis by the UK’s leading pollster here).  Most if not all the defecting MPs are in favour of a Second Vote, ie putting Brexit back to the people.  The polling shows a lead of 8-10% to Remain, and some of that is due to those who voted Leave changing their minds.

Above: a long running YouGov poll (from August 16 to 4 Feb 19) showing the progressively larger majority against leaving the EU, since July 2017.

This is the immediate reason why these defections are significant (and Theresa may has no majority in Parliament without support of the small Northern Irish DUP which is pro-Leave, although most people in Northern Ireland are pro-Remain).

On 23 June the day of the EU Referendum I tweeted ‘#EUref if Britain votes Remain it will change the political culture. If Leave it will only change the political parties’.   By which I meant that a vote to Remain would be a vote for the future and modernity, and confirm the ‘reflexive’ changes such as towards a clean-tech and open culture, as ‘normal’ but a Leave vote would be a social throwback which would precipitate some sort of reconfiguration of politics.    The tweet was a bit trite perhaps but the underlying social factors driving a slow increase in the percentage of Pioneers with their ‘progressive’ values, have not gone away, and there is a huge skew to younger people favouring Remain.  Many of them assumed that Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn would turn out to be against Brexit but the opposite has proved to be the case.

In short although political change in the UK is a lagging indicator of social change not least because the first-past-the-post-system of geographical constituencies hugely favours and over-represents the two large ‘catch all’ parties, and so anchors most politicians in those parties for fear of losing their jobs, the slow but powerful current of values change will sooner or later prove an irresistible force.  The most dynamic expression of this in the UK right now is support for the school and student strikes over climate change, led almost entirely by young women, most too young to vote.  If it was possible to vote for @gretathunberg she would be likely to get elected.

That may encourage campaigners for ‘progressive’ causes but their greatest challenge in the coming years, and that of politicians who share their values, is going to be to find ways to design campaigns and politics which reaches across rather than entrenching values divides (see for instance why forced PCness is not a good strategy).  As Peter Lilla has argued, it is the politics of the common good, not of identity differences which we need, and that requires acceptance of values diversity.

For more on Brexit and evidence of the values split and dynamics see some of my blogs using the CDSM Cultural Dynamics Strategy and Marketing Values Modes model of Settlers, Prospectors and Pioneers:

Brexit Values Battle’ (March 2016) showed that security-driven Settlers in the UK, France, Italy and Germany shared a common dislike of the EU and immigration

Brexit Values Story Part 1’ (February 2017) –  my own story of how, it appeared to me, values had helped drive the politics of the Referendum result.  That drew on many sources (blog here, slides with main content here)

Jeremy Corbyn’s dilemma (July 2017) – choosing the old or the young (so far he has opted for the old)

Brexit Values Story 2.1 (August 2017) with values maps and data on how people had voted in the 2017 General Election, comparing this with their Leave/Remain votes in 2016

And Inglehart et al (source of above diagram) using a similar values model but one that does not measure the Prospectors:  The Silent Revolution in Reverse: Trump and the Xenophobic Authoritarian Populist Parties(free pdf) and his 2018 bookCultural Evolution, and forthcoming with Pippa Norris (published already in the US) Cultural Backlash.


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