

Campaigning With Trump In The Whitehouse

Chris Rose chris@campaignstrategy.co.uk www.campaignstrategy.org December 2016

[Brexit](#) and the US Presidential election both split countries along a values divide. Nearly all 'progressive causes' have their main support ([see these examples](#)) on the losing side. So shock, alarm and despond has been the order of the day, and campaigns feel unusually mixed up with politics.

I will come back to Brexit and the "bigger picture" of how society got here, the dynamics of 'post truthery', and implications for the future but this article explores the more straightforward question of campaigning with Trump in the Whitehouse. It's a topic of interest far beyond the US so although I do not pretend to be an expert on American politics, I hope North American readers will forgive me for misinterpretations, errors or for simply mis-stating the obvious.



photo: D-Vare under Creative Commons licence

It's Not All About Trump: Don't Grant Him More Influence

There is no doubt that Trump's election is bad news on issues from environment to [human rights](#). NGOs and others have identified many possible nightmare consequences of a Trump Presidency. Yet dwelling on these nightmares, joining them together in a 'sum of all fears' and personifying them through Trump, risks doing exactly what campaigns do not need: turning him into a fear-inspiring omnipotent colossus, not a '[monkey on the back](#)' but a King Kong on the back of 'progressives'.

An 'Ethical Panic' could disable effective campaigning by inflating the perceived threat of Trump and sapping the sense of self-agency and hope which fuels change campaigns.

In the full-nightmare version, Trump sets out to act on all his pledges, fixes things so he can, his followers enforce change across society, and a New Order is then imposed in America, and by extension, beyond its borders. Trump's iconography supplies plenty of visual memes to populate such a totalitarian vision: the faux gold [dictator-style palace](#), the un-reality TV celebrity [Apprentice](#) magnate, private [jets](#) and [1984-style stage sets](#). But it's not real. The full-nightmare factors are unlikely to happen but if campaigners treat the nightmare as if it is real, they will be granting Trump influence beyond his power. It is the individual, more isolated supporters of campaigns who are most at risk of this contagion of fear and gloom. Campaigners in organisations need not just to press on as they doubtless all are but also to share situation analysis with supporters and show why project-Trump is actually more vulnerable than its current domination of the media implies.

Fear and panic [stop us thinking analytically](#). Stress, or focusing on one fearful possibility, shuts down our other senses. 85% of aircraft incident [reports](#) include a loss of situational awareness. Plus if people feel powerless and do not expect a result ('[values expectancy](#)') they are far less likely to support a change campaign. So campaign groups do not need to talk up Trump in terms of power but to talk him down, by seeing him for what he is, and by clearly exploring the real situation he will face once in office.

Not A Demon



An Incubus demon - The Nightmare by Henry Fuseli wartburg.edu image public domain. Incubi were regarded as real in law in the Middle Ages but are now regarded as an effect of sleep paralysis.

It is said that the existence of *Incubi* (m: Incubus, f: Succubus), night-demons which 'lay down' on victims during nightmares, was recognized as real in Medieval law. Today, the fear-inducing effects of sleep-paralysis are thought to explain such 'demons', as our sleeping brain intuitively tells us that *someone* or *something* must lying upon us to keep us still. But recognizing it as real in law, made the demons more real. Next step could be witch-hunts or campaigns against them.

Trump is not a demon, he's just a man, flawed and limited, who by accident as much as design, has ended up, probably ill-prepared and ill-equipped in the Whitehouse: a malign version of Chance the gardener, in Hal Ashby's film *Being There*.

So should you be planning a brainstorm in which the Trump factor may loom large, perhaps watching *Being There* first, might not be a bad idea. Maybe try going away and planning a campaign which helps further your mission but which does *not* require any campaigning against Donald Trump. It will do at least some good, if only to your peace of mind.

Is Trump Nearing His High Point ?

I could be totally wrong but seems likely that Project Trump is nearing what you could call 'Peak Lacquer'. The stack of golden dreams he sold to the electorate remain mostly intact, and he and his team have been 'making the weather' by shocking the media and opponents with cabinet appointments which, as Sarah Snyder puts it 'have inspired considerable anxiety among his critics'. From here on in, even maybe before his inauguration, the gloss may begin to come off, and in the end his administration will run aground on difficult issues as others have before.

Normal politicians expect this to happen. They know that they will get to realise rather few of their hopes and dreams, and only make good on some of their commitments through a mixture of luck and *real politick*, the art of the possible. But Trump campaigned on being able to do better than the politicians, and by all accounts inhabits his own public self-myth. His unusual psychology has attracted a lot of attention and may now play a central role in how a Trump Administration actually behaves.

What Do We Know About Trump The Person ?

Dan P McAdams of Northwestern University is a psychologist who studies how personality traits of US Presidents correlate with how they perform in office. Earlier this year published a readable article in *The Atlantic* : [The Mind of Donald Trump](#).

McAdams identified Trump as a narcissist, very low on 'agreeableness', high also on extroversion and grandiosity and higher on open-ness (read in this context, less ideological or fixed in his views), than for instance G W Bush. Another psychologist Glen

Geher writes that Trump ‘absolutely and unequivocally’ meets the test for narcissism + psychopathy + Machiavellianism, known as the ‘dark triad’. These three traits are often associated with dictators and over-bearing bosses who achieve results through manipulation and coercion.



photo: Notions Capital (Flickr/CC 2.0)

Deep-seated anger, says McAdams, may fuel both Trump’s extroversion and disagreeableness, the latter enabling him not to care about who or what gets crushed in his relentless search for attention and the next ‘success’. He ends his piece “*It is always Donald Trump playing Donald Trump, fighting to win, but never knowing why*”.

Given that Trump probably does not know himself what he will do if and when he becomes President, apart from seek more opportunities to gain attention, look powerful and be a winner, and may not even know why he did it once he has, there’s not a lot campaigners can gain from trying to game political or ‘issue’ scenarios in advance, based on Trump’s psychology. Try to understand it yes, tactically exploit it maybe sometimes but do not let it become a demon that takes over your thinking.

Trump’s eccentric mental make-up could easily have left him as one of many ‘dark triad’ figures stalking Wall Street and the world of CEOs (probably like some he has imported

into his putative administration) if it had not been for some unfortunate happenstance which mythologised him.

In her *New Yorker* article [*Donald Trump's Ghostwriter Tells All*](#), Jane Mayer traces how her fellow journalist Tony Schwartz helped create the myth which Trump now inhabits, by ghosting the 1987 best-seller *The Art of the Deal*. This book probably also ignited his idea of becoming President. Trump used it to launch his election campaign, declaring “We need a leader that wrote ‘The Art of the Deal’”.

By reframing politics as simply deal-making, Trump certainly would have appealed to many of the [Golden Dreamers](#) and [Settlers](#) who we can be confident voted for him (and in the UK, [Brexit](#)): people alienated from complexity and yearning to turn the clock back to a time in which they felt respected, things were simpler and more secure, and the path to success was familiar, structured and ordered. But that’s another story.

Although the publisher for *The Art of The Deal* told Mayer “Trump didn’t [even] write a postcard for us!”, once it was a success, Trump convinced himself that he *had* written the book himself. (Here’s clue for campaigners: create a success Trump can align with and he may try to claim it: success is catnip to Trump. Winning the Whitehouse is unlikely to satiate his appetite for more successes).

The Art of the Deal created a myth for Trump. Timothy L O’Brien, author of *Trump Nation*, categorized it as a ‘non-fiction work of fiction’. The book led to the invention of the tv show *The Apprentice* starring Trump, and that super-sized him into a celebrity. Mayer quotes O’Brien as saying it was “myth-making on steroids”.

Unlike the psychologists, Schwartz observed Trump at very close quarters. He is now famous for collaborating with Trump to eavesdrop on his business calls to gather material because Trump, with ‘no attention span’, could not give him interviews.

A highly regretful Schwartz told Mayer in 2016:

“I put lipstick on a pig ... I feel a deep sense of remorse that I contributed to presenting Trump in a way that brought him wider attention and made him more appealing than he is.”

While working on the book, Schwartz wrote in his private journal: “the book will be far more successful if Trump is a sympathetic character—even weirdly sympathetic—than if he is just hateful or, worse yet, a one-dimensional blowhard [self-important, egomaniac].” His pivotal ghost-writer’s invention was the term ‘truthful hyperbole’. He had Trump write:

“I play to people’s fantasies. . . . People want to believe that something is the biggest and the greatest and the most spectacular. I call it truthful hyperbole. It’s an innocent form of exaggeration—and it’s a very effective form of promotion.”

Mayer quotes Schwartz as now saying “deceit is never “innocent” .. truthful hyperbole’ is a contradiction in terms. It’s a way of saying, ‘It’s a lie, but who cares?’”

“Lying is second nature to him,” Schwartz told Mayer in 2016. “Trump has the ability to convince himself that whatever he is saying at any given moment is true, or sort of true, or at least *ought* to be true.”

In his *Atlantic* article Dan P McAdams noted:

It is generally believed today that all politicians lie, or at least dissemble, but Trump appears extreme in this regard. Assessing the truthfulness of the 2016 candidates’ campaign statements, PolitiFact recently calculated that only 2 percent of the claims made by Trump are true, 7 percent are mostly true, 15 percent are half true, 15 percent are mostly false, 42 percent are false, and 18 percent are “pants on fire.” Adding up the last three numbers (from mostly false to flagrantly so), Trump scores 75 percent. The corresponding figures for Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton, respectively, are 66, 32, 31, and 29 percent.

Being, as Tony Schwartz puts it, ‘indifferent’ to truth, obviously helped Trump execute an election strategy heavily based on winning attention by triggering outrage and shock.

As many people have pointed out, this could be dangerous in the Whitehouse but it may also frustrate some of Trump's plans once they encounter external realities.

Squaring the Circle

Trump in political office faces a very different reality from Trump the property magnate. So far he and his fixers like Steve Bannon have been living in 'Trump The Movie' but once in office he will be in power but far less in control of events.

Problematic external realities could include having to balance and manage things such as: the expectations of his electoral base, the Republicans in Congress, and relationships with businesses, markets, other countries, and team management, not to mention events.. Those he will probably have fewest problems with for the first two years include the Democrats, and "them", the 'progressives', vilified in his campaign to the delight of some of his base. His backers of course, can be rewarded by influencing appointments.

The Administration itself straddles these categories: at the moment he can still talk about it as if it has nothing do with him, for example attacking the CIA, and play the Washington outsider. To get anything done he will have to reconcile himself to being in charge, trapped inside a zero sum game of managerial competence and responsibility which may test his capacity for working with others.

Management

It may seem a mundane category but the mis-match between what has worked for Trump of Trump Towers and what will be needed in the Whitehouse may be one of his greatest challenges, if the experience of being President is to match his self-myth of invincibility.

McAdam quotes Trump from his manifesto *Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again*: "I find the people who are the best in the world at what needs to be done, then I hire them to do it, and then I let them do it ... but I always watch over them".

The US Government however is far too large for this. Even by appointing members of his family, Mafia-style, to key positions, Trump cannot hope to personally appoint, let alone 'watch over' all the 'great people' he will need in order to get things done. Trump also claims to be adept at 'getting people into a room and negotiating compromises until everyone walks out of that room on the same page' but he will not be able to conduct all those negotiations himself.

If he blames others when something is not delivered as promised, or if his people fall out amongst themselves, Trump will look incompetent in management. If he blames others for failures then he will be acknowledging that he has failed in his claims that he will shake up Washington and make it work differently. If his 4am tweets fall silent and Trump retreats behind his spokespeople, he will look as if he has gone native. "You're fired" may rid Trump of troublesome appointees but it will soon accumulate a legacy of resentful critics.

Trump has a thin skin. These things may matter to him much more than to people with less of a need for the esteem of others. His need to be in the centre of attention may compound his dilemmas. This may not often produce campaign opportunities but it may diminish 'brand Trump'.

Business

This has to be one of the greatest areas of opportunity for campaigners. Trump may not care much for many other American businesses but others in his Administration will do, and so too will many Republican interests with influence in Congress. The differences between Trump's policies and the interests of businesses will create spaces of opportunity for campaigns.

There are some similarities between the current situation – with the head of Exxon picked as prospective secretary of State - and 2001 when G W Bush rejected the Kyoto

Protocol (on climate change). That also spread a shockwave of dismay through the NGO community and 'progressive' governments. I'm not saying it's in any way a blueprint for campaigns today but you can read about some campaigns such as 'Families Against Bush' (FAB) aimed at smoking out corporations and getting them to take sides for or against the Bush position at the time, [here](#) (unpublished material drafted for *How to Win Campaigns*) and, although it's mostly vanished from online history, this report in the [Wall Street Journal](#). Using a red-green boycott list, FAB succeeded in getting a number of US corporations to publicly distance themselves from the Bush position, including Bank of America, Dow Corning, BP Amoco, Cartier and Colgate Palmolive, before the 9/11 attacks made it impractical to run any campaign titled "Against Bush". While few corporations actively wanted to fall out with Bush in public, for some their interests in aligning with the values and politics of society at home or abroad, and simple conviction that climate change was a reality they had to deal with, exceeded their desire to optimise relations with the Bush Administration.

At that time many feared that American isolationism would wreck the Kyoto Protocol and with it the climate treaty but it didn't, and the Bush Administration's attempt to set up an alternative international agreement came to nothing. Nor did it stop corporate action towards sustainability or State level action to cut emissions and encourage renewables. Fifteen years on, the difference between many big corporations and the fossil fuel lobby has widened to a gulf, and around the world, plummeting costs of renewables and storage are creating a 'new normal'.

Recently for example, [the UK Government failed](#) to win as much private sector investment in new gas-fuelled electricity generation as (for ideological reasons) it had hoped for, when it held an auction of contracts to supply the National Grid. What it did see however was the biggest yet award of contracts for grid-scale battery technology designed to capture surplus wind and solar generation, as it came in at half the price of new fossil gas-fired capacity.

In the US, writers at Bloomberg's recently pointed out ([Economics to Keep Wind and Solar Energy Thriving With Trump](#)) that in some parts of the US, the cost of new unsubsidized wind and solar is half to one third that of new coal. They note: 'Donald

Trump will have limited influence on the U.S. utility industry's push toward renewable energy, according to executives and investors'.

Trump may actually have meant it when here pledged to bring back coal jobs but technology and economics are against him. Devashree Saha of the Brookings Institution points to five market factors meaning Trump's pro-coal vision is likely to remain just that, a vision.

Eventually turning Trump towards 'making America great' through clean energy technologies would of course be a great prize. It may seem impossible to imagine now as he imports climate-sceptics to head every relevant agency but as McAdam points out, because of Trump's psychological open-ness, he could yet prove more pragmatic and flexible than expected. If it begins to look impossible to make a success out of 'bringing back coal', he could lose interest. Unpalatable as it may be to some, campaigners may want to put their minds to helping climate-friendly businesses and States to find a way to enable President Trump to look good by embracing green technology (gold monogrammed solar panels perhaps ?) and create more economically viable jobs at the same time.

Meanwhile frustrated climate campaigners outside the US – possibly in India and Europe – might be tempted to take a closer look at coal imports from the US, and see if they can't get some cancellations.

Pleasing The Base

Right now Trump is riding high, picking right-wing critics of Federal Government Departments to lead them at cabinet level (such as Rick Perry for the Department of Energy). It looks like a wrecking team set on rolling back the state, a signal appreciated by his more conservative and richer backers. Trump proposes more mining and drilling on public lands, although the Obama Administration has been busy expanding legal safeguards which may take some time to undo. And while many conservatives are in favour of the principle of deregulation and removal of 'red tape' to 'create jobs', when it comes to removing protection for *their* National Park or protected area, they are often

against it. America can expect a host of local battles, and quite possibly an increasing divergence between States, if and when Federal powers are devolved to State level, as some of his appointees are committed to do.

Critically though, Trump was also elected with the votes of poorer Americans, with promises of 'repatriating jobs' and bringing back traditional industries. Cutting budgets and cancelling programmes is relatively easy. Delivering new results is generally much harder and some of Trump's electoral policies may have little more substance than soundbites.

In the case of energy for instance, Trump has been in favour of both fracking more gas, and mining more coal. Yet the rise in gas use has been the main cause of the decline in coal. Former Republican Congressman for South Carolina Bob Inglis was reported in *The Guardian* on 12 December as saying, "Donald Trump has made promises to coal and also to natural gas. The problem is that these promises are inconsistent with each other and that will be revealed. The question is how quickly coal miners, and others, will realize that they have been had."

A similar story may be repeated on other issues, and as Inglis notes: 'there won't be the scapegoat of Barack Obama to blame anymore', nor indeed the Democrats in Senate or Congress. How will President Trump take to being the bearer not of dreams but of bad news? He will want someone to blame, which is something for campaigners to take into account. At any event, having made so many sweeping promises, and in particular to people who most trust what they experience first-hand, Trump may soon begin to disappoint.

Economics, The Markets and The Republicans

During his campaign Trump proposed tax cuts (especially for the rich), 'bringing back American manufacturing jobs' from abroad, an infrastructure stimulus plan, a reduction in the trade deficit, dramatic action to cut the national debt and action to prevent an overly strong dollar. Trump's economic proposals have oscillated wildly, at one point

including tax cuts so huge that even abolishing the entire Department of Defense wouldn't have balanced the budget.

The inconsistent and even incoherent nature of Trump's economic plans maybe just show that imagining how to sort the US economy is a lot more complicated than running a property development business. The latest version of his tax plan is forecast to increase the deficit and the national debt, while slashing corporate taxation and lowering taxes on richer Americans.

The 'stimulus package' featured prominently in the election and was his most understood economic proposal. Trump would invest money, to pay workers to rebuild crumbling infrastructure, creating jobs. America would be rebuilt. Things would be put back to how they should be. But what played well as a simple story of cause and effect in his campaign, may already be entering a muddle that ordinary people may not understand the workings of, but in which they glimpse classic Washington horse-trading, Wall Street getting richer, and ultimately, a signal that it is business-as-usual, "all a mess" in which they lose out. This too could sap the energy and authority of a Trump administration.

In recent weeks for instance the dollar has been surging, although during his election campaign Trump denounced a 'strong dollar' as damaging the competitiveness of US companies. The cause is mainly *international* market reaction to his promised stimulus package, to be financed by selling government bonds. Anticipating that stimulus will cause inflation and a hike in interest rates, money is flowing into American bonds and the dollar rises. This makes imports cheaper and most likely the trade deficit wider. It will also make it harder to 'bring back American jobs'. "It looks like a slow motion train wreck to me", the aptly named former US Treasury official David Dollar told the *Financial Times*.

Nor do Republicans who run the Senate and the House of Representatives entirely approve of Mr Trump's plan, although he can do little if they do not approve it.

In November a *Politico* magazine article explained: 'It was supposed to be a big, beautiful infrastructure bill. But President-elect Donald Trump's pitch for a \$1 trillion upgrade of the nation's roads, bridges, tunnels and airports is already running into potholes as it meets reality in Washington. The overwhelming sticking point, as always, is how to pay for it'.

According to *Politico*, Trump's 'senior adviser Steve Bannon has portrayed it as a massive borrow-and-spending binge that would make conservatives "go crazy," telling The Hollywood Reporter: "With negative interest rates throughout the world, it's the greatest opportunity to rebuild everything. ... We're just going to throw it up against the wall and see if it sticks.'" Several of the 'new ideas' considered by Trump's team were (like an Infrastructure Bank) actually the same as those proposed by either Obama or Clinton, or both but by December the \$1trillion was down to \$550bn.

Republicans such as Mitch McConnell leader in the Senate, and Speaker Paul Ryan in the House, would like less government spending and borrowing, not more. They voted down much of Obama's stimulus package for similar reasons. Now Trump will have to find a way to convince them and their colleagues to adopt a policy many see as more Keynesian and Democrat than conservative.

Meanwhile other critics say that the plan requires a combination of new tax credits for investors, and tolls and other user fees for Americans, meaning profits for Wall Street and higher living costs for ordinary families. 'Investors would choose which projects would be built, without considering public needs'.

'Policy experts from both sides of the aisle have faulted Trump's broad tax and spending agenda for not even remotely adding up' says *Politico*. 'They say the tax cuts he's proposed would add \$10 trillion to the national debt in the coming decade, while his pledge to trim the debt to zero would require savage cuts to federal spending'.

If Trump does get his plan through, it will indeed require 'deal making' but of a very Washington type. One possibility, perhaps remote, might even be a higher tax on oil, an idea supported by some Democrats and at least one Republican (Former Transportation Chairman Don Young of Alaska supports it for transportation projects).

British columnist Peter Wilby recently wrote that Trump “probably thinks that, in the White House, he can intimidate everybody. But as James Carville, the adviser to Bill Clinton, once said, that is the role of the bond market”.

Other Countries

US Presidents often come to power on a campaign platform in which domestic issues and perspectives dominate, and then spend a lot of their time dealing with aspects of foreign policy. Trump has made sure of this by his repeated assertions that he will ‘bring back American jobs’, as well as his vaguer statements about spending less on the military abroad (such as in NATO in Europe), and his promise to pull out of the Paris climate agreement. (McAdam points out that to ‘make America great again’ Trump says a first step toward victory is building up the armed forces: “Everything begins with a strong military. Everything.” Perhaps, given that Trump is so besotted of the military and the US military has long taken climate change seriously, they might be the best messengers for campaigners to work with to reach Trump on climate).

The US is still the most militarily powerful nation on earth but it is no longer the world’s largest economy. It now comes in third after China and the EU. ‘Putting America first’ as Trump has promised, may not always mean that the US can dictate events, or even get the “deals” it wants.

At the moment it is unclear how connected the US under Trump wants to be. He has said that he will walk away from the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement which the USA and 13 other Asian and American nations had agreed to. As Richard Elsner pointed out in a blog at this website, this prompted a rush by Chile, Peru, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, to join the rival ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (or RCEP), a rival trade organisation set up by China in 2012, as an alternative and counter to TPP, from which it had been intentionally excluded by the USA’. This bloc also includes economic giant India.

Elsner noted at the end of November:

Former Australian Trade Minister Craig Emerson reportedly said last week: “The symbolism is clear: The US has abandoned Asia, the ‘pivot to Asia’ is dead, and China’s influence over the region’s trading is secured”. So, in wake of Trump’s assumption of the Presidency in January, it can be assumed that China will swiftly achieve the institutional and global political heft that Gideon Rachman foresaw in his insightful book “Easternisation” (2016, Bodley Head). Rachman forecast that such a shift would gradually flow from the economic power which China has accumulated over the past 30 years or so, only now it could happen quite suddenly.

Trump is already involved in a rather one sided war or words with China over currency. He accuses China of ‘currency manipulation’ and ‘devaluing’ its currency to the disadvantage of the US (making Chinese goods more competitive, including ‘American’ goods like Apple computers, often sold to Americans but made in China) but others see this as simply market economics.

While Trump talks big about punishing China over currency ‘manipulation’, China owns 30% of US debt. Holding US debt has helped keep China’s currency low which helps Chinese jobs. Longer term China wants its currency to replace the dollar as the dominant global reserve. The US has in turn benefited because the weaker Chinese Yuan has made imports from China cheaper for US consumers: something not mentioned in Trump’s campaign call to ‘bring back American jobs’. Money has lately been flowing out of China due, according to the *Financial Times*, ‘slowing growth, a mountain of corporate debt, recurring asset price bubbles and President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive’, and this puts on pressure for a devaluation, which the Chinese government has been fighting by buying its own currency. Trump’s own borrowing plans for his infrastructure package are already making this process worse (raising the dollar), showing that even though he may adopt an isolationist trade policy, the US economy is internationalised through financial markets.

The [Financial Times](#) says

Mr Trump has a number of options if he wants to go after China. The current law would call for intensified dialogue with China — or negotiations — should the administration

find Beijing to be a currency manipulator. If that did not lead anywhere it would call for possible sanctions including excluding Chinese companies from government procurement contracts, something that would have negligible impact on China.

Beyond that if negotiations failed, US law would allow Trump to unilaterally impose tariffs against China, possibly for up to a year but this “would hurt US consumers as much as China”. In the bigger picture, Trump’s difficulty is that the US economy has structural problems, such as an [ageing population and weakening productivity](#), whereas although they have problems, powers such as China are on the rise. A bellicose approach to international relations based on the aggressive negotiation techniques he adopted over property deal-making, may not work as well as his supporters have been led to expect.

Conclusion

Trump’s Presidency will almost certainly be bizarre and it may be catastrophic – let’s hope not – but it could also turn out to be a lot more ordinary than his election campaign promised. American experts will do a better job than me of identifying the rocks, shoals and rapids that Trump’s plans may run into but they are certainly there. NGO campaigners need to stick to their objectives and plan accordingly. The real nature of campaign opportunities will become apparent over time. Meanwhile they must not allow themselves or their supporters to be mesmerized by nightmares.

ends