{"id":1601,"date":"2017-08-28T12:15:28","date_gmt":"2017-08-28T12:15:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/threeworlds.campaignstrategy.org\/?p=1601"},"modified":"2019-02-24T15:40:22","modified_gmt":"2019-02-24T15:40:22","slug":"brexit-values-story-part-2-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/threeworlds.campaignstrategy.org\/?p=1601","title":{"rendered":"Brexit Values Story Part 2.1"},"content":{"rendered":"

Research from surveys conducted before and after the 2017 General Election shows that Leave\/ Remain voters split along values lines more than party lines, or indeed by age, class or sex.\u00a0\u00a0 Brexit Values Story Part 2.1 explores the data and implications, for example for the Labour party which has recently changed position on Brexit. It shows that the Labour \u2018heartland\u2019 is not now \u2018traditional working class\u2019 but far more defined by being Pioneer and like most of Britain, \u2018middle class\u2019. It argues that \u2018on these data, Labour has the potential to gain majority support if it continues to reposition away from Brexit but only if now also attracts more Prospector support\u2019.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This blog may be mainly of interest to UK and EU readers with an interest in \u2018Brexit\u2019 and values but the way a society can split along values lines has far wider significance for campaigners, as well as politicians and others concerned with social cohesion.\u00a0 One lesson may even be campaigns themselves risk creating counter-productive values divides if they are values-projectors rather than behaviour-generators.\u00a0 This will be discussed in a follow-up blog, Brexit Values Story Part 2.2.<\/strong><\/p>\n

[This blog is long – you can download it as a pdf here<\/a>]<\/p>\n

(one incorrectly placed chart replaced February 2019)<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2018Brexit Values Story Part 1<\/a>\u2019 (February 2017) presented some evidence as to how an unprecedented values split divided British society over a major political issue \u2013 \u2018Brexit\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0 The underlying reasons for this have huge implications for campaigns in many countries (as it could happen elsewhere), and for cohesion or lack of in any society, especially given the bubble-making role of social media<\/a>. \u00a0\u2018Brexit Values Story Part 1\u2019 had to rely on tangential evidence (although there was lots of it) as we had no before and after values survey.\u00a0 That\u2019s now changed as values-researchers CDSM have started publishing data<\/a> from April and June 2017 surveys run before and after the UK General Election, in which they also asked about voting in the election and the 2016 EU Referendum.<\/p>\n

Post-Referendum British Values Surveys <\/strong><\/p>\n

After the June 8th<\/sup> 2017 UK General Election, CSDM (\u2018Cultural Dynamics\u2019) conducted a nationally representative survey of 2000 people aged 18 – 85<\/a>, which asked questions including which parties they had voted for on 8th<\/sup> June 2017, and how they had voted in the June EU 2016 Referendum on membership of the EU (aka \u2018Brexit\u2019).\u00a0 The survey was segmented by values, as well as class (Socio Economic Group), age, sex etc..<\/p>\n

Pat Dade<\/a> and Les Higgins from CDSM have been posting detailed articles at the CDSM website<\/a> about this survey and a similarly segmented survey in March 2017, a week after the General Election was called.\u00a0 This showed<\/a> that the Registered Electorate (England, Wales and Scotland) has a different values profile from the population as a whole.\u00a0 The Electorate is 40% Pioneer, 30% Prospector and 30% Settler whereas the population is 38% Pioneer, 37% Prospector and 25% Settler.\u00a0 This is partly due to the greater representation of Settlers amongst older age groups, and that in turn will have made some difference to the results of both the General Election and the EU Referendum, for which the Electoral Roll was used to determine who could take part.<\/p>\n

Serious followers of British politics or values may be interested in an article posted by Les Higgins<\/a> in which he compares the values of those who were pleased or upset with the result of the General Election (a \u2018hung Parliament\u2019 in which Conservative Prime Minister Mrs May lost her majority) and the deal she then did with the Ulster (Northern Ireland) party the DUP, in order to form a government.<\/p>\n

Since then Pat Dade has written a piece about<\/a> the values profile of those registered and not registered to vote, the role of Kahneman\u2019s \u2018System 1\u2019 and \u2018System 2\u2019 in political decision-making, the representativeness of the surveys, and other issues, as well as interesting articles on who voted Conservative<\/a> and Labour<\/a>, including the difference between actual voting and declared intention. \u00a0[Conservative support was strongly skewed to over 55, upmarket (AB), male, and \u2018Settler with a fringe of Prospectors\u2019 \u2013 a \u2018voter profile\u2019 says Dade, \u2018that would seem to have a \u2018sell-by date\u2019 all over it\u2019.\u00a0 Labour base support was strongly skewed Pioneer and younger, having lost most of its traditional Settler base and failing, as Ed Miliband did, to capitalise on Prospector \u2018intent\u2019 to vote Labour, when it came to the actual vote].<\/p>\n

Some of these results are summarised below, along with values maps for LibDems and UKIP which Dade has yet to publish on, plus also previously unpublished data on how voting Leave or Remain related to values, and voting at the 2017 General Election.<\/p>\n

Basic Data*<\/p>\n

Voted Conservative and voted Leave\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 21.4%<\/p>\n

Voted Conservative and voted Remain \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 11.9%<\/p>\n

Voted Labour and voted Leave\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 12.2%<\/p>\n

Voted Labour and voted Remain\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 20.4%<\/p>\n

Voted Lib Dem and voted Leave\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 1.5%<\/p>\n

Voted LibDem and voted Remain \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 4.8%<\/p>\n

Voted UKIP and voted Leave\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 2.5%<\/p>\n

Voted UKIP and voted Remain\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 0.2%<\/p>\n

Voted Leave\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 44.2%<\/p>\n

Voted Remain \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 43.5%<\/p>\n

Did not vote EU Referendum\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 12.3%<\/p>\n

[other parties not shown]<\/p>\n

* Voted by party at General Election 2017 and Leave\/Remain at UK EU Referendum 2016 (all data from June 2017 CDSM survey, base 2000)<\/p>\n

Key to colours used in the main diagrams:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Index colour codes in the values tables only:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

\u2018Skews\u2019 or over and under-indexes are calculated for each values group, against each question option, so that the size differences of each values group are taken into account when assessing significance.\u00a0 These are shown in the coloured cells of values tables.\u00a0 100 indicates average (i.e. in line with the population as a whole, taking into account the size of the group in the population), and anything above 100 is an over index and anything under is an under index.<\/h4>\n

Skews are identified at three confidence levels.\u00a0 Red, orange and pale orange mean the option is chosen more<\/em> than would be expected by the number of Pioneers or prospectors or Settlers (or Values Modes) in the total sample.\u00a0 Pale green, dark green or blue mean the option is chosen less<\/em> than would be expected by the number of Pioneers or Prospectors or Settlers (or Values Modes) in the total sample.<\/h4>\n

Survey Results<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The post-election June 2017 CDSM survey asked people how they voted at the Referendum.\u00a0 The results (above) of 44.2% Leave and 43.5% Remain are similar to the actual Referendum result of 51.9% Leave and 48.1% Remain.<\/p>\n

Here\u2019s how the Referendum vote differed in terms of values:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The key data about values differences at the \u2018Maslow Group\u2019 level (Settlers, Prospectors and Pioneers) is all contained in this table.\u00a0 The raw sample numbers are in the first row of each option. The second row shows the percentage within each values group taking that option (columns total 100% vertically).\u00a0 The third row shows the % values make up of that option (sum to 100% horizontally).\u00a0 The far right column indicates the total number of people and the percentage of the whole they represent, taking each option.<\/p>\n

This 2000 person sample of the electoral roll population (England, Scotland and Wales) is 40.5% Pioneer, 28.7% Prospector and 30.8% Settler [bottom row].\u00a0 As noted earlier, this is somewhat different from the wider national population because some people are not registered to vote.\u00a0\u00a0 The population is 38% Pioneer, 37% Prospector and 25% Settler, meaning that Settlers are significantly over-represented in the electoral population compared to the national population, and Prospectors are under-represented.\u00a0\u00a0 Prospectors are also more likely not to vote than Pioneers or Settlers even when registered to do so, and this will have made a small but possibly critical difference to the Referendum result.<\/p>\n

The coloured indexes in the fourth row of each option show that, as was expected from previous studies reported in Brexit Values Story Part 1, Pioneers skewed strongly towards voting Remain, and Settlers even more strongly towards voting Leave, while Prospectors were more divided and over indexed on not voting.<\/p>\n

The index figures show that Pioneers were 25% more likely and Prospectors 8% than the population average to vote Remain and Settlers 40% less likely than the average to do so.\u00a0 In contrast Pioneers were 25% and Prospectors 14% less likely than the average to vote Leave whereas Settlers were 46% more likely than average to vote Leave.\u00a0 Pioneers were average on not voting, Prospectors over-indexed on not voting by 21% and Settlers were 24% less likely than the average to not vote in the Referendum.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Above: \u2018terrain map\u2019 of the Leave vote by values.\u00a0 (Top right segment: Settler, left segment, Prospector, bottom right, Pioneer).\u00a0 It is very strongly matched to the Settler values group.\u00a0 This is very similar to those previously measured as critical of the EU (see Brexit Values Story Part 1).\u00a0 45.1% of the Leave vote was Settler whereas only 30.8% of the electorate were Settlers.\u00a0 30.3% were Pioneers and 24.6% were Prospectors.\u00a0 Golden Dreamer Prospectors (next to the Settlers upper left) more voted Leave than the Now People Prospectors (lower left).<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Above: the Remain vote by values.\u00a0 Strongly concentrated in Pioneers, with wide support amongst Prospectors but not many Settlers. [50.4% Pioneer,\u00a0 31.1% Prospector,\u00a0 18.4% Settler].<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Above: those (12.3% in total) who voted in the 2017 General Election but who did not vote in the EU Referendum: 41.8% are Pioneers.\u00a0 These people are most concentrated in the \u2018Transcender\u2019 Pioneer Values Mode. This supports previous surveys which found that those who failed to vote in the Referendum would, had they voted, probably have voted Remain.\u00a0 Only 9.3% of registered Settlers failed to vote.<\/p>\n

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Chart<\/a> showing various surveys on how people who did not vote at the Referendum say they would have voted<\/em><\/p>\n

A higher overall turnout would therefore most likely have resulted in a Remain decision, and goes some way to explain why \u2018the country\u2019 still feels divided over \u2018Brexit\u2019 and many see it as unfinished business.<\/p>\n

Those who did not vote in the Referendum but who went on to vote in the General Election were three times as likely as the average to be young (18-20, index 330) while 35-44 year olds were also 61% more likely than average to do this.\u00a0 Over 65s on the other hand were under-represented in this group by 63 points.<\/p>\n

Turnout campaigns were aimed at young people before the Referendum and (more so) the General Election and this seems to have had an effect, although too late for those who wanted to avoid a vote for Brexit.<\/p>\n

As Pat Dade\u2019s annotation (above) says, it seems that complacent Transcenders (index 156) formed the core of this group, perhaps being so incredulous at the claims of the Leave side, so unexcited by the Remain camp and so fed up with the whole Referendum campaign, that they did not turn out.\u00a0 Perhaps instead, they then turned out at the General Election, where they mostly voted Labour (see below).\u00a0 These are the highest self-agency group of all the Values Modes, posing a potential problem for Jeremy Corbyn (see this recent blog<\/a>), as well as for Brexit.<\/p>\n

The Settlers however were gripped by the (Leave) Referendum Campaign, many seeing it as a \u2018patriotic duty\u2019<\/a> and an opportunity to reassert national identity against \u2018foreigners\u2019: as a \u2018defence of us\u2019 issue it was tailor made to activate the Brave New World Values Mode which (see above) under-indexed on failing to turn out by 90% (index 10).<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Only 3.3% of the Leave voters did not go on to vote in the 2017 General Election. (above)\u00a0 These are strongly concentrated in the \u2018Roots\u2019 Settler Values Mode (red area), the group with lowest self-agency and typically not very engaged in politics or civic issues.\u00a0 It may be that having done their bit to turn back the clock on unwelcome change at the Referendum and having got a result, they saw little need to engage with the subsequent election.<\/p>\n

Nobody knows what would happen if events turn out so as to create another \u2018referendum\u2019 on Brexit, formal or de facto but my guess is that these results suggest that the Leave vote would be both smaller and less solid than it was at the time of the Referendum.\u00a0 The main risks for any \u2018Remain\u2019 campaign would again be distraction, disorganisation and complacency.<\/p>\n

Failing more detailed qualitative work with those who voted Leave, we can\u2019t say why 30.3% of the Leave vote came from Pioneers (made up of 33.1% of all Pioneers) but as suggested in Values Story of Brexit Part 1<\/a>, this is probably a more fractured group than the Remainers and might include:<\/p>\n